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This comparative case study examines the actions that the Haitian and Dominican governments, 
respectively, have taken to develop and sustain tourism within their borders. My premise is that 
governments, through state institutions and policies, can implement branding strategies that 
impact and change existing country image perceptions. Expanding on the determinants of 
tourism demand literature, I present a theoretical framework for how government institutions 
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INDEX WORDS: Public Safety, Infrastructure Investment, Nation Branding, Tourism Drivers, 
Political Stability, Marketing Promotion, Government Policy, Haiti, Dominican Republic, 
Country Image Perception, Tourism Arrivals and Receipts  
WHAT DIFFERENCE DO THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS OF HAITI AND THE 

















A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
in the College of Arts and Sciences 
























Ludmilla Marie Anglade 
2018  
WHAT DIFFERENCE DO THE GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS OF HAITI AND THE 








LUDMILLA MARIE ANGLADE 
 
 
Committee Chair:  Henry Carey 
 
Committee: Charles Hankla 
Jennifer McCoy 
 
Electronic Version Approved: 
 
Office of Graduate Studies 
College of Arts and Sciences 
Georgia State University 




To Dr. Henry “Chip” Carey - all his encouragement, support, and patience with me through this 
entire process was immeasurable.  And, to the few and far between special friends (Michelle, 
Timethia, Nadine, Angela, Begum, Elder Yul, and Collette) whose truth telling, motivating 
words, confidence in me and endless support was pivotal in helping to advance this thesis.  The 




I sincerely thank God for getting me to the finish line. Everyone associated with the completion 
of this thesis was so invaluable to me. I want to thank Dr. Sara Gershon for extending my 
graduation deadline (several times!). And, very special thanks to Dr. Henry "Chip" Carey for 
bearing with me with an attitude of grace as I labored through the many years it took to finish 
this thesis. Truly, I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Charles Hankla and Dr. Jennifer McCoy for 
being part of my thesis committee. Their contribution helped me push past the proposal stage to 
a successful defense…thank you so much! Many thanks to my family: our Haitian roots helped 
inspire this project. I give special recognition to my dear friend, Michelle, who was at my first 
grad school degree graduation (when I should have finished this degree). She really provided 
understanding, instead of being critical about the time I was taking to finish this thesis (even 
though, technically I did work full time, while completing my MIB and an MBA during this 
entire 9-year process). Her support through the end means so much to me. I give special thanks 
to my friend, Timethia, who really went above and beyond to look over my thesis (numerous 
times), help me with my proposal & defense presentations (and she even sent me her dissertation 
slides as a guide). My dear friend, Nadine…her motivation, prayers and unwavering support 
pushed me to finish. My friends, Elder Yul, Collette and Robin, I am so grateful for their care 
and spiritual support. I give thanks to my friend, Angela, for teaching me to reach for 
authenticity; that message truly made a difference. I’m so grateful for my friend, Begum, for the 
special visits, the laughs, being positive and always believing the best for me! And, I’m thankful 
for my friend, Xotchitl, who made me laugh countless times; and, she helped me relieve stress 
my entire grad school experience with those random “happy hours”—especially while I juggled 




well as my Victory family, for their prayers on my behalf. Thank you to my InterNations 
family…Gonzalo, Mariella, Magaly, Daphne, Malaika, Daniel, Liliana, Rachel, Caesar, Turki, 
Pranav and Kara. You mean so much. I want to thank my fit-fam (Donna, Candice, Kendall, 
Courtney, Wallace, my coaches and trainers, Dave, Jesus, Jose and Gui, to name a few). I needed 
those special times and stress relievers…I’m also grateful for the laughs (there were many). 
Thank you to my old co-workers for their support (Val, Regina, Delphia, Beverly, Barbara and 
Nina); and to my Too Groovy salon family (Shannon, Dawn and Angela) for their well wishes.  
Finally, special thanks goes to the Political Science and Business departments at GSU (especially 
Dr. Dakhli, Pedro Carillo and my fellow grad students from both departments for all of their 
input, guidance and support over the years).       
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................ V 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................ XII 
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................... XIII 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................... XIV 
1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Purpose of the Study ........................................................................................... 2 
1.2 Background on Tourism in Haiti and the Dominican Republic ..................... 2 
1.3 The Gap in the Literature that this Paper Resolves ........................................ 4 
1.4 My Argument....................................................................................................... 5 
1.5 Tourism Demand Determinants Literature ...................................................... 6 
1.1.1 Political Stability as a Security Determinant ................................................. 7 
1.1.2 Tourism Infrastructure Expenditure............................................................ 10 
1.1.3 Nation Branding as a Marketing Determinant ............................................ 14 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .......................................................................... 17 
2.1 Public Safety Theory ......................................................................................... 18 
2.2 Infrastructure Investment Theory ................................................................... 19 
2.3 Nation Branding Theory ................................................................................... 21 
2.4 Country Image Perception (Intervening Variable) ........................................ 22 
2.5 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (Dependent Variable) Theory ..................... 24 
viii 
2.6 Independent Variables ...................................................................................... 25 
2.6.1 Public Safety (IV1) ........................................................................................ 25 
2.6.2 Infrastructure Investment (IV2) ................................................................... 29 
2.6.3 Nation Branding (IV3).................................................................................. 33 
2.7 Intervening Variable ......................................................................................... 37 
2.7.1 Country Image Perception ............................................................................ 37 
2.8 Dependent Variable ........................................................................................... 39 
2.8.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts ..................................................................... 39 
2.9 Methodology ...................................................................................................... 44 
3 ANALYSIS: COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES ................................................. 48 
3.1 Haiti Tourism Case Study (1940-2017) ........................................................... 49 
3.1.1 Public Safety .................................................................................................. 49 
3.1.2 Infrastructure Investment ............................................................................. 53 
3.1.3 Nation Branding ........................................................................................... 56 
3.1.4 Interaction of IVs with Country Image Perception ..................................... 58 
3.2 Dominican Republic Case Study (1940-2017) ................................................. 60 
3.2.1 Public Safety .................................................................................................. 60 
3.2.2 Infrastructure Investment ............................................................................. 62 
3.2.3 Nation Branding ........................................................................................... 63 
3.2.4 Interaction of IVs with Country Image Perception ..................................... 65 
ix 
3.3 Haiti and Dominican Republic Comparative Case Study (1940-2017) ........ 66 
3.3.1 Public Safety .................................................................................................. 66 
3.3.2 Infrastructure Investment ............................................................................. 68 
3.3.3 Nation Branding ........................................................................................... 70 
3.3.4 Interaction of IVs with Country Image Perception ..................................... 73 
4 CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................... 77 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................ 87 
APPENDICES ................................................................................................................. 93 
Appendix A - Public Safety/Crime Rate Level (Haiti) ............................................. 93 
Appendix B - Public Safety/Crime Rate Graphs (Haiti) ......................................... 94 
Appendix B.1 Other types of crime prevalent in Haiti ............................................ 94 
Appendix C - Public Safety/Political Stability Index (Haiti) ................................... 95 
Appendix D - Public Safety: Political Stability Percentile Rank (Haiti) ................ 96 
Appendix E - Infrastructure Investment/Public and Private Sector (Haiti) ......... 97 
Appendix F - Infrastructure Investment/PPIs (Haiti) ............................................. 98 
Appendix G – Nation Branding/Public and Private Tourism Promotion (Haiti) . 99 
Appendix H – Nation Branding/Public Tourism Promotion Investment (Haiti) 100 
Appendix I – Haiti’s Country Image Perception Scale .......................................... 101 
Appendix J – Tourism Arrivals and Receipts Graph (Haiti) ................................ 102 
Appendix J.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals (Haiti, 1940-1980): ......... 102 
x 
Appendix J.2 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Tourism receipts (Haiti, 1940-1980):
 ............................................................................................................................................. 103 
Appendix J.3 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals (Haiti, 1981-2010): ......... 104 
Appendix J.4 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Receipts (Haiti, 1981-2010): ........ 105 
Appendix J.5 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals and Receipts (Haiti, 2011-
2016):................................................................................................................................... 106 
Appendix K - Public Safety/Crime Rate Level (D.R.) ........................................... 107 
Appendix L Public Safety/Crime Rate Graph (D.R.) ............................................ 108 
Appendix M – Public Safety/Political Stability Index (D.R.) ................................ 109 
Appendix N – Public Safety/Political Stability Percentile Rank (D.R.) ............... 110 
Appendix O – Infrastructure Investment/Public and PPP (D.R.) ........................ 111 
Appendix P - Infrastructure Investment/PPI (D.R.) .............................................. 112 
Appendix Q -Nation Branding/Public and Private Tourism Promotion (D.R.) .. 113 
Appendix R - Nation Branding/Public Tourism Promotion Investment (D.R.) .. 114 
Appendix S - Dominican Republic’s Country Image Perception Scale ............... 115 
Appendix T - Tourism Arrivals and Receipts Graph (D.R.) ................................. 116 
Appendix T.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals and Receipts (D.R., 1930-
1980):................................................................................................................................... 116 
Appendix T.2 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals (D.R., 1981-2000): ......... 117 
Appendix T.3 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Receipts (D.R., 1981-2000): ......... 118 
xi 
Appendix T.4 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals (D.R., 2001-2016): ......... 119 
Appendix T.5 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Receipts (D.R., 2001-2016): ......... 120 




LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1 Most Significant Determinants of Tourism Demand (Dependent Variable) 
Identified in Literature ..................................................................................................... 7 
Table 2.1 Theoretical Expansion of the Determinants of Tourism Demand Literature ...... 18 
Table 3.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts in Haiti (1940-2016): Scaled ratings based on 
analysis of data compiled for each variable .................................................................. 47 
Table 4.1 Tourism arrivals and receipts in the Dominican Republic (1930-2016): Scaled 





LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 2-1 Theoretical Model- How the Independent Variables Interact with the 
Intervening Variable to Increase Tourism Arrivals and Receipts ............................. 24 
Figure 3-1 Political instability & international arrivals in Haiti (1945-1984) ....................... 50 
Figure 3-2 Political instability & international arrivals in Haiti (1995-2015) ....................... 50 




LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
1. Dependent Variable (DV) 
2. Dominican Republic (D.R.) 
3. Independent Variables (IVs) 
4. Public Funding Division of Dominican Republic’s Central Bank (INFRATUR) 
5. Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure (PPI) 
6. Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) 







1 INTRODUCTION  
For many low-income developing countries, with limited natural resources to 
competitively trade globally, tourism often serves as a vital economic driver.  To that end, 
governments of these nations will make attempts to attract private sector investment, to generate 
tourist arrivals and travel receipts, with the hopes that an abundance of tourism development will 
create linkages with other sectors to produce growth in their economy.  The reliance on this 
industry is paradoxical, as governments of many poor nations habitually underestimate their role 
as the key stakeholder in determining the acute strategies which will attract, grow, and retain 
tourism demand.  Furthermore, government leaders, of developing countries, may desire to 
generate economic growth through tourism channels; however, they fail to consider that tourism 
is as particularly sensitive to political factors as it is to economic and environmental ones.  
Moreover, governments must understand that their country projects an image that potential 
investors and tourists may perceive as feasible for investment and travel.  The global perception 
of a country is partially exogenous and beyond a government’s control.  However, there are 
preemptive measures that governments can take, to attract tourism, to contribute to a positive 
perception of their country as a viable travel destination.   Developing countries’ governments, 
who are successful at generating a thriving tourism sector, work to create safe and stable political 
environments, invest a tremendous amount of state capital in tourism sustainability, hire 
destination managers, execute sound tourism public policies, and consult with public relation 
firms to assist in the process.  Conversely, governments who fail at fostering a sustainable 
tourism industry, and remain in economic jeopardy, can attribute as reasons political instability, 
insufficient security policies, and deficient tourism promotion strategies, along with a lack of 
capital expenditure investment in developing quality infrastructure.   
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1.1 Purpose of the Study  
The purpose of this study is to advance the tourism determinants literature by 1) 
evaluating the effectiveness of government institutions in generating higher levels of tourism 
arrivals and receipts in two test countries, Haiti and the Dominican Republic; and 2) providing a 
more comprehensive theory and methodology for measuring security, infrastructure, and 
marketing promotions’ impact on tourism demand.  The main question I seek to answer in this 
paper is what difference do the government institutions for each country make in producing 
tourism growth?  Ultimately, I expect the answer to this question to solve the conundrum for 
why Haiti’s once thriving tourism sector deteriorated while the Dominican Republic’s tourism 
industry sustained even though both countries, respectively, endured similar political and 
socioeconomic challenges.   
1.2 Background on Tourism in Haiti and the Dominican Republic  
 In a 2004 economic and sector study regional report by the Inter-American Development 
Bank, the history of tourism in Haiti is outlined and the sector is categorized as having uneven 
development that was marred by many “setbacks” (Lundhal, 2004).   Tourism began in mid-1940 
with around 5,000 visitors (Lundhal, 2004); and, by 1956, Haiti had reached 67,700 travelers 
(Séraphin, 2011).  During the 1950s and early 1960s, Haiti was perceived by travelers as a good 
place to visit.  And, subsequently, during that time, Haiti experienced one of the fastest growth 
rate of visitors in the Caribbean (Séraphin, 2011).  Travelers to Haiti preferred visiting the island 
compared to its neighbor, the Dominican Republic, which was not yet known as a worthy travel 
destination (Séraphin, 2011).  However, violent unrest during the cruel dictatorship of Francois 
“Papa Doc” Duvalier led to a sharp decline in visitors in 1963.  After that, Haiti was considered 
unsafe by travelers and a country to avoid.  The negative country perception ended when Jean 
3 
Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier became president in 1972; and, tourism experienced a revival.  
Tourist numbers peaked to 300,000 visitors by 1980 (Steif, 1985; Fass, 1988).   However, this 
upsurge was temporary as a rumor developed in 1982 that AIDS originated in Haiti; and, then 
Duvalier’s dictatorship was overthrown in 1986.  Except for cruise ship tourism in Labadee, 
Haiti’s mass tourism potential collapsed after the 1986 coup; and, a series of political and socio-
economic problems began to plague Haiti that had lasting effects well into late 2010.  In late 
2010, after a 7.0 earthquake hit the country, the Haitian government began making serious 
efforts to revitalize tourism (Séraphin, 2011). Foreign investors began constructing hotels in 
Haiti to cater to the country’s new brand of travelers: aid workers, missionaries and business 
people.  There is now legitimate hope that the country may finally capture a small portion of the 
mass tourism market of overnight visitors. 
 Around the time that Haiti’s tourism sector was first developing in the 1940s, the 
neighboring Dominican Republic’s tourism industry was non-existent.  The 1960 Fodor's Guide 
to the Caribbean, Bahamas and Bermuda (1960) offered an extensive 29-page review of Haiti as 
a travel destination and classified it as "most exotic, very rewarding, plenty of accommodations 
from simple, low-budget to luxurious" (p. xxii; Fuller, 1999).   Meanwhile, the 9-page 
assessment of the Dominican Republic was that it had 56 revolutions and 43 presidents between 
1844 to 1930; and, the country was considered a "comic opera prototype of Caribbean 
instability" (Fodor, 1960).  Furthermore, in its discussion of the Dominican tourism office, Fodor 
described that the "Direccion Genereral de Turismo" (328) was "the only official tourist office in 
the Caribbean which seems to us to fail consistently in its task of promoting tourism. Its 
inefficiency is lamentable.  Its standards of courtesy, far below the normal Dominican level...The 
office's policy...does not seem to be aimed at facilitating travel or the circulation of information 
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about the republic's tourists’ suggestions...We cannot deplore too strongly the uncooperative 
attitude and the general inefficiency..." (Fodor, 328).  By 1967, when the Dominican government 
had commenced taking significant steps to build tourism, Haiti's tourism industry had 
experienced strong growth (Fuller, 1999).  However, at present, there is a stark contrast between 
the flourishing mass tourism sector of the Dominican Republic which had 5,959,300 million 
stay-over arrivals (with 335,000 cruise ship arrivals) in 2016 (WEF Report on the Dominican 
Republic, 2018).  In 2016, Haiti’s small niche market of visitors received 515,804 stay-over 
arrivals (with 673,501 cruise ship passengers) (WEF Report on Haiti, 2018).  The drastic 
turnaround for the Dominican Republic’s tourism sector can be attributed to strong political 
support for tourism development by the Dominican government (Fuller, 1999; World Bank, 
2011).   
1.3 The Gap in the Literature that this Paper Resolves  
During my preliminary research on the determinants of tourism demand for this study, I 
discovered a gap in how the main drivers of tourism demand are operationalized.  Much of the 
tourism determinants literature focuses on identifying the main individual drivers of tourism 
demand.  However, discussions on whether and how those drivers are connected or how they can 
be managed to produce tourism demand are insufficient.  The literature identifies political 
stability (treated as evidence of tourism safety and security), infrastructure quality, destination 
attractiveness and marketing promotions (or nation branding) among a list of significant 
individual drivers of tourism demand for developing countries.  Yet, a scholarly focus on 
individual drivers is inadequate because it does not provide a complete explanation for how 
tourists are often sensitive to a combination of factors which influence their travel behavior.  If a 
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country is politically stable, for example, but it lacks quality infrastructure and marketing 
promotions about the country is low, it is unlikely that country will see a rise in travel arrivals.   
Tourism demand is essentially subject to potential travelers’ preferences based on their 
perception of a countries’ overall reputation as a travel destination.  And, several factors work to 
create a country’s image which, over time, produces its reputation to the potential travelers and 
investors.  Therefore, a scholarly discussion on how a country’s image is perceived, based on 
those significant tourism drivers, is very important because a potential tourist’s perception of a 
country is what ultimately influences travel behavior.  Despite this, there is a lack of research on 
how the most significant drivers identified in the literature, beyond political stability, contribute 
to a country’s image to impact a traveler’s perception of the destination.  In addition to safety 
concerns, infrastructure quality and marketing promotions are important drivers that influence 
country image.   Moreover, the tourism driver literature also does not adequately explain the role 
of governments have in managing tourism drivers to influence how their country is perceived by 
potential tourists.   In addition, the exclusive focus on political stability in the literature as the 
primary indication of security in a country is insufficient.  As a measure for safety and security, 
in addition to political stability, I focus on crime rates in each test country.  Finally, as one of the 
test countries, Haiti, has a unique demographic of tourists, I expand on how tourism demand is 
traditionally measured to sufficiently assess the overall level of tourism arrivals and receipts for 
each test country.  The purpose of my study is to examine government effectiveness in creating a 
positive country image perception that produces an increase in tourism arrivals and receipts. 
1.4 My Argument  
I evaluate the political and social, pull or “attractive”, and tourism competitive factors 
that significantly impact tourism arrivals in Haiti and the Dominican Republic.   Many potential 
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causes may exist to explain why the Dominican Republic has fared better in its tourism sector 
compared to Haiti.  To narrow down the endogenous contributing factors, it is important to 
determine the strategic actions (or, rather, inactions) taken by the key stakeholder in each 
country, namely the government, in establishing, advancing and sustaining tourism within its 
borders.  I contend that governments, through state institutions and policies, can implement 
strategies to impact and change existing country image perceptions to generate an increase in 
tourism arrivals and receipts (tourism arrivals and receipts are an expansion of the common 
measurement for tourism demand that will be explained in my theory section).  The strategies are 
based upon government institutions: 1) ensuring that tourists enjoy a politically stable and crime 
safe environment through the implementation of public safety measures (a political factor); 2) 
investing in the construction of quality infrastructure (a pull factor) using public and private 
sector capital investments; and 3) engage in tourism marketing through nation branding policies 
and partnerships with the private sector (a tourism competitive factor).    
I hypothesize that successful management of these three factors by effective government 
institutions are essential to create a positive country image which increases tourism arrivals and 
receipts.  This thesis will evaluate how effective government institutions were in controlling 
these factors in three comparative studies: 1) a separate historical individual country analysis 
comparing Haiti’s past and current tourism sector; 2) a historical individual country analysis 
comparing Dominican Republic’s past and current tourism arrivals and receipts; and, 3) a 
comparison between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. 
1.5 Tourism Demand Determinants Literature 
The literature on tourism demand has established that tourism demand is influenced by 
numerous factors.  The most comprehensive study, on which variables most impact tourism 
7 
demand in developing countries, provides a panel data analysis of Latin American and Caribbean 
countries and establishes three main classifications for the determinants (Pivčević et all, 2016): 
1) pull (or attractive) factors—based on the characteristics of the inbound travel destination 
which includes destination promotional programs, destination attractiveness, social and cultural 
ties, climate, events; 2) political and social factors —which includes political stability within the 
inbound travel destination as important for security as the study establishes that the higher the 
political stability, the higher the tourism demand (Eugenio-Martin, Morales and Scarpa, 2004 as 
mentioned in Pivčević et all, 2016); and 3) pull-tourism competitiveness factor—an inbound 
country determinant of tourism demand that includes nation branding/marketing promotions.    
The determinants, from the three classifications, with the most positive, statistically 
significant and correlated relationship with tourism demand are reflected in Table 1.1 below.  
The current literature provides a foundation for further expansion that the theoretical framework 
of this paper is based upon. 
Table 1.1 Most Significant Determinants of Tourism Demand (Dependent Variable) 
Identified in Literature 
 
Causes/Influences Tourism Demand 
Determinants 
Independent Variables in the 
Literature 
Political and Social 
Factors 
 Political Stability/Security  Political Stability 
Pull Factors  Destination Attractiveness 
 Infrastructure 




 Marketing Promotions  Nation Branding 
 
1.1.1  Political Stability as a Security Determinant 
One of the major considerations for a potential traveler seeking to visit any foreign 
destination is the country’s political stability and internal security environment.  In tourism 
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demand literature, the predominant focus has been the destination’s level of political stability.    
Generally, any evidence of unrest within a country will likely deter visitors from deciding to 
travel to that destination.  Hall (1994), determined that political stability is a “fundamental 
precondition” (Hall, 1994) to establishing a successful tourism sector.  Baker (2012) contends 
that “modern mass tourists tend to long for relaxing, safe, and unconcerned vacations when they 
travel.’’ (Baker, 2012: 91) 
Studies centered on the impact of political stability on tourism demand have varied in 
focus, methodology and scope.  Many authors have differed on the parameters for measuring 
political stability or rather its inverse, namely, political instability as well as the testing variable 
for tourism.  One branch of scholarship discusses political instability and its potential impact on 
traveler behavior in certain countries.  However, that stream of literature also heavily examines 
the effect of terrorism on tourism development.  Researchers, under this stream, diverge on 
whether to treat terrorism as a measure of political instability or as a phenomenon that is either 
incidental to or creates instability.  This debate often distracts researchers from developing 
studies on the types of security challenges that may influence tourism demand beyond political 
stability.  Despite these deviations, all scholars agree that political stability is vital for tourism; 
and, by contrast, political instability within a country produces a negative effect on both tourism 
demand and overall tourism development.   
Regarding the first stream of scholarship on the impact of political instability on tourism 
demand, many researchers believe that terrorism is significant to the overall study of political 
instability’s influence on tourism development (Alvarez & Campo, 2014; Coshall, 2003; 
Maditinos & Vassiliadi, 2008; Nassar, 2012; Neumayer, 2004; Sonmez, 1998; Yap & Saha, 
2013).   Contrarily, others debate that terrorism is often an exclusive phenomenon that only 
9 
certain countries experience.  Furthermore, terrorism is not only separate from political 
instability, but driven because of it (Campos, 2009).  However, proponents of including terrorism 
as a form of political instability assert that the study of them are important or relevant to tourism 
because researchers have identified that terrorists often, specifically, target tourists to advance 
their terroristic goals (Sonmez, 1998; Neumayer, 2004).  Reports of politically motivated attacks 
on tourists legitimizes the security concern that potential travelers have as they make travel 
decisions.  However, beyond terrorism, the literature has not provided further evidence that 
travelers have been targeted in destinations where other forms of political instability are 
prevalent.  
Out of the first branch of scholarship, a second stream of literature emerged to provide 
explanations for why political instability adversely affects tourism demand.  Political instability 
often generates negative publicity; and, because of deleterious travel reports, tourism demand 
decreases (Thapa, 2003).  The decline in tourism arrivals comes from the fact that political 
instability, along with civil unrest and war, often creates the perception of a safety risk for 
travelers (Lepp, 2003).  Therefore, the perceptions of political instability and safety become the 
prerequisite for tourists to travel (Hall and O’Sullivan, 1996).   The second branch of literature 
concerns itself with the measurement of increase or decrease in tourism travel based on a 
country’s temporary or long-term instability.  Depending on a travel consumer’s perception of 
the country’s risk for travel, research findings are that the perception of high travel risk not only 
influences a travel consumer’s behavior, but the country’s overall image (Ryu, 2005).  
Furthermore, the longer the period of instability, the more likely a travel consumer will 
determine that a country is too unstable for travel (Yap & Sap, 2013).  However, if the instability 
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is incidental, stemming from an event or series of events, travel consumers will view the 
instability as temporary.   
In his literature review of the subject, Hall reiterates Richter and Waugh’s (1986) 
contention that governmental leaders underestimate political peace as the primary and 
fundamental precondition for tourism development (Nyaruwata, 2013).  Ultimately, tourists 
seriously consider safety and security problems when choosing travel destinations (Nyaruwata, 
2013).  Therefore, it is the government’s responsibility to create a politically stable environment 
to attract and retain a thriving tourism industry for the purposes of economic development 
(Nyaruwata, 2013).  Causevic and Lynch (2013) point out that there is void in the research with 
studies focused on how governments handle challenges with political instability within their 
borders.  Most specifically, literature is still lacking on regulations and laws which are created to 
manage tourism development post-conflict or counteract the decline in tourism demand caused 
by political instability (Causevic and Lynch, 2013).    
1.1.2  Tourism Infrastructure Expenditure 
Much of the tourism determinants literature focuses on infrastructure quality as a vehicle 
to develop tourism and attract tourism demand.  Few tourism driver studies specifically 
investigated spending on infrastructure directly.  Within the research on the tourism drivers, that 
lead to successful tourism development, authors either incidentally mention which stakeholder is 
most fiscally responsible for spending on infrastructure or they fail to adequately specify the 
responsible party.  The literature on this subject is important for two reasons: 1) establishing that 
infrastructure is a prerequisite for maintaining a successful tourism sector; and 2) incidentally 
linking the importance of spending on infrastructure to tourism demand.   
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The study that comes close to discussing the stakeholders most responsible for 
infrastructure spending is Giap et al’s study on Malaysia’s tourism sector.  Giap et al (2016) 
contends that government expenditures on tourism promotion and infrastructure, specific to the 
enhancement of airport facilities, are the main determinants of tourism demand in Malaysia.  
Similar studies on developing countries also identify infrastructure quality as either an important 
factor or the most vital determinant of tourism demand (Khadaroo-Seetanah, 2007; Dwyer & 
Spurr, 2011; Assaf & Josiassen, 2011; Seetanah et al, 2011; Giap et al, 2016 and Jovanovic & Illic 
(2017)).  However, despite their shared contention that having a quality infrastructure impacts 
tourism demand, the authors differ on which type of infrastructure is most relevant for tourism.  
Furthermore, the tourism demand literature asserts that small island countries are particularly 
impacted by the quality of their infrastructure especially as it applies to their airport conditions 
(Giap et al, 2016).  The argument was previously established by McElroy’s study on small island 
tourism development where the author found it difficult to classify the least traveled islands 
(McElroy, 2006).  This was because the least traveled islands had the tendency to lack enough 
government expenditures to sustain tourism due to their inadequate land infrastructure 
development; and, as a result, those islands were not prime for mass tourism or significant 
tourism demand (McElroy, 2006).   
Across the literature, authors diverge on their conceptualization of tourism infrastructure.  
Some authors classified the infrastructure that impacted tourism demand in limited terms of land 
or road networks (McElroy, 2006).  While other researchers focused their studies on the impact 
that transport infrastructure (in terms of transport services) had on tourism demand (Prideaux, 
2000; Khadaroo & Seetanah, 2007; Seetanah et al, 2011).  Prideaux (2000) referred to transport 
infrastructure as public infrastructure, which includes a country’s transport system.  He further 
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defines the transport system as it applies to tourism as ‘‘the operation of, and interaction 
between, transport modes, ways and terminals that support tourists into and out of destinations 
and also the provision of transport services within the destination.’’ (Prideaux, 2000).  He argued 
if tourists were hindered to travel to their chosen destinations by inefficiencies in the country’s 
public infrastructure, the likeliness of them choosing alternate destinations increases.  This is 
because transport inadequacies create a lengthy and uncomfortable travel within a tourist’s travel 
destination as well as drives the cost of travel to uncompetitive prices (Prideaux, 2000; Seetanah 
et al, 2011).  Based on a country’s transportation systems need for efficiency, Prideaux (2000) 
further argues that transportation infrastructure is a precondition of a successful tourism sector.  
However, Prideaux does not address the country’s government’s role in financing or arranging 
private sector capital to fund its transportation infrastructure.  
In their journal article “Does Infrastructure Matter in Tourism Development” centered on 
the island of Mauritius, Seetanah et al (2011) mention that many different forms of infrastructure 
(road, communication, waste and energy) collectively serve as fundamental parts of a country’s 
tourism industry. The researchers suggest that the various types of infrastructure jointly comprise 
the basis for a country’s “tourism infrastructure” (Seetanah et al, 2011); and tourism 
infrastructure, is one of the leading drivers of tourism.  Seetanah et al (2011) extend the 
measurement of the tourism infrastructure model to include the number of hotel rooms available 
within Mauritius.  The authors reiterate that government expenditure on tourism infrastructure, 
among other tourism related spending such as tourism promotion, is highly significant for 
generating tourism demand.   Moreover, in their extension of the tourism infrastructure model, 
they find that hotel capacity is statistically significant for travelers who seek to stay at hotels; 
but, it is not significant for tourists who prefer lower cost options (Seetanah et al, 2011).     
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Assaf and Jossiassen (2012) confirmed that a country’s tourism and related infrastructure 
base of quality roads, railroads, ports and airports was the most important determinant of tourism 
demand.  This is because a tourist’s ease of movement is impacted by the quality of a nations’ 
infrastructure (Prideaux, 2000; Assaf and Jossiassen, 2012). The authors attempt to combine the 
road and land infrastructure with transportation infrastructure to create a more comprehensive 
definition of tourism infrastructure.  The study is significant in that it also established that 
government expenditure was a highly ranked determinant that positively impacted tourism 
performance.  Moreover, the small island, Jamaica, which has a similar political, economic and 
social system with the test countries of this thesis was included as a test country within Assaf and 
Jossiassen’s study.  It was one of the nations showing a positive performance measurement 
against government expenditures and infrastructure.    
Research conducted by Giap et al (2016) on tourism demand determinants in the 
developing country, Malaysia, produced statistically significant results that government 
expenditure on tourism promotion along with infrastructure investments in airport facilities 
created tourism sector growth.  The study provides insight on three key factors relevant to this 
thesis: 1) it confirms that government expenditure is an important aspect of tourism demand and 
2) reiterates the value of infrastructure as a tourism driver; and 3) by finding government 
expenditure on tourism promotion a causal factor of tourism sector growth in a developing test 
country, it establishes a link between government spending and a factor of nation branding (i.e. 
tourism promotion).  The areas for further study based on gaps in Giap et al’s (2016) research 
include: 1) extending the conceptualization of tourism infrastructure to a more comprehensive 
categorization; and 2) assessing the impact of government expenditure on a newly 
conceptualized tourism infrastructure on tourism demand.       
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Li et al (2013) conducted a study on tourism development in Malaysia, using a triangular 
causal relationship model and inverted tests, and found that government capital investment in 
infrastructure and other tourism drivers leads to an increase in tourism receipts.  The researchers 
then determined that, because of the increase in tourism receipts, economic growth within the 
country was achieved (Li et al, 2013).  An important study that included Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic, along with other developing countries with similar political and socioeconomic 
backgrounds, measured the direct relationship between economic tourism and growth from 1985 
to 1998 (Eugenio-Martin et al, 2004).  Significant to this thesis, it was discovered that tourism 
increases if three key factors are established: infrastructures, education and safety.  The 
implications from the Eugenio-Martin et al (2004) study are that capital investment in 
infrastructure and safety, factors which are essential for attracting tourist investors and tourists, 
will lead to an increase in tourism development. 
1.1.3 Nation Branding as a Marketing Determinant 
Nation branding is still developing as a concept in political science scholarship.  An 
ongoing debate persists within the literature concerning nation branding.  There is a 
misperception about nation branding solely being a marketing tool versus a concentrated strategy 
which governments can actively implement with the help of tourism promotional agencies.  
Challenges exist on how measure or conceptualize nation branding, as governments often 
confuse it with public relations; and, as a result, nations often employ promotional advertising 
campaigns instead of improving the structural problems within their country that contribute to 
their brand image.  Despite the scholarly dispute, the consensus of authors, across all disciplines, 
is that nation branding a determinate of tourism demand.   
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Simon Anholt first coined "nation brand" term in 1996 (Anholt, 1996).  The term referred 
to the genuine reputation of states; and, thereby, nation branding included the cities, regions and 
municipalities that behave similarly to brand images of corporations and products (Anholt, 
2011).  Anholt posited that those images are pivotal to advance, prosper and properly manage 
nations (Anholt, 1996; Anholt, 2011).  To understand the dynamics of how to best brand a 
country, several researchers from various disciplines have adopted broad interpretations and 
variations of the nation brand designation.  Because of extensions of the nation brand definition 
in the literature, there is a noted debate among scholars concerning the use of the nascent term 
“nation branding” (Anholt, 2011, Kaneva, 2011).  Further, Anholt believes that the growing use 
of the term “nation branding” is misleading to his original theory on nation brands (Anholt, 
2011); and governments, in collusion with branding consultants, mistakenly believe they can 
manipulate their country image using commercial advertising to promote a better reputation than 
they possess.  The controversy over the practical use of nation branding in literature has created a 
lag in the discipline which needs to be remedied.  Nation branding studies are pivotal for tourism 
development research to explain how to measure the impact of a country’s reputation on tourism 
arrivals and tourism investment.  It is also valuable to understand how governments can develop 
a strong brand image despite having experienced political, social and economic widely known 
difficulties within their country’s borders.   
The most comprehensive literature review on nation branding and state image comes 
from researcher Nadia Kaneva (Kaneva, 2011).  In recognition of the discourse between scholars 
on the use of the terms nation brand versus nation branding, and to advance research on the 
subject matter, Kaneva argues that critical studies have a minority perspective in the ongoing 
debates about the nation branding concept (2011).  To resolve this, the author reviewed 186 
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research studies across various disciplines, from 1997 to 2009, to clarify the actual significance 
of the numerous perspectives on nation brand research.  Recognizing the widely accepted term 
“nation-branding” as the act of branding a nation (Kaneva, 2011), Kaneva identifies that there 
are three categories of literature, namely, technical-economic, political and cultural.  Most 
relevant for the development of this thesis, are the studies classified as 1) technical-economic-
which are concerned with economic growth, efficiency, and capital accumulation and include 
many tourism studies; and 2) political-which are mainly centered on the influence of country 
images on states’ participation in a global system in the area of international relations (Kaneva, 
2011).  
In today’s globalized world, nations and brand image integrate in the minds of potential 
customers and investors creating a “country of origin” effect (Van Ham, 2009).  The country of 
origin effect is where a nation’s reputation influences consumer purchasing power or foreign 
direct investment (Van Ham, 2001; 2009).  A state’s good reputation and image is part of its 
“strategic equity” (Van Ham, 2001) where a country, much like a company’s products, relies 
heavily on consumer and investor confidence based on their interpretation of that brand’s quality.    
Szondi, 2008, defined nation branding as the strategic self-preserving means in which countries 
created “reputational capital through economic, promotion and social interest promotion at home 
and abroad” (Szondi, 2008: 5).  The main benefit of nation branding is to strengthen the 
country’s brand (Anholt, 2009), as well as improve the national image through promotional 
efforts.  Morgan and Pitchard (2000) explained the importance of branding countries by stating 
that the competition for travelers in tourism is not achieved through brand value; instead, 
effective nation branding influences what is perceived and felt by travelers about the destination.  
Tourism branding and promotion cannot be conducted without considering the country’s image. 
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Therefore, tourism promotion is only successful if countries first develop a successful national 
brand (Cromwell, 2016). 
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Several possible factors impact tourism demand.  Therefore, predicting the specific 
elements that produces demand is complex.  Despite the various possible variables that exist as 
determinants, certain significant tourism drivers can be further developed to help predict the 
likelihood that governments of developing countries can implement strategies that impact 
country image perceptions to attract more visitors and travel receipts.  I argue that it is 
probabilistic that tourism arrivals and receipts, the dependent variable of this paper, is generated 
when travelers perceive a country’s image as positive and viable for travel based on a 
combination of three independent variables derived from the main drivers of tourism demand: 
public safety, infrastructure investment and nation branding, a country’s ability to develop a 
strong brand that it can successfully market and promote to its target market of potential 
travelers.  The premise for my theory is that governments, through state institutions and policies, 
can implement strategies that impact and change existing country image perceptions.  This is 
accomplished when government institutions work together to create a favorable country brand by 
investing in the development of functional benefits {public safety and infrastructure quality, as 
foundation for destination’s appeal} that is supplied to the potential travelers who demand them 
in order to visit, lodge and spend money in the country.     
My theoretical framework is based upon an expansion of the most statistically significant 
tourism demand determinants identified in the literature namely, political stability and security, 
infrastructure quality and nation branding as the vehicle for marketing promotions.   In this 
paper, I develop more precise measurements for these variables as well as expand on the 
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operationalization of tourism demand in the form of “tourism arrivals and receipts” which serves 
as the dependent variable of this study.  Table 2.1 outlines the expansion of the most significant  
determinants of tourism demand that was used as the basis for this paper’s independent variables. 
Table 2.1 Theoretical Expansion of the Determinants of Tourism Demand Literature 
 
Causes/Influences Tourism Demand Literature 
Independent Variables 
Thesis Independent Variables 
Political and Social 
Factors 
▪ Political Stability ▪ Public Safety  
o Crime rates 
o Political stability 





▪ Infrastructure Investment 
o Government spending on 
infrastructure 





▪ Nation Branding 
o Marketing Promotions 
▪ Nation Branding 
o Public tourism promotion 
investment 
o Public Private Tourism 
Promotion Partnerships 
2.1 Public Safety Theory 
Safety and security are prerequisites for successful tourism development, as tourists 
desire to travel to destinations that are safe and where security is assured (Mansfield and Pizam, 
2006).  If travelers believe a destination is unsafe, it will cause them to develop a negative 
impression of that destination, thereby causing tourism demand to decline (George, 2010; 
Ghaderi et al, 2017).  The literature on tourism demand has established that political stability is a 
positive determinant of tourism demand.  Scholarship has also determined that the converse 
relationship exists when instances of political instability threaten safety and security at tourist 
destinations.  The focus on political stability as a measure of security is well founded.  However, 
the measurement of security must be expanded include the examination of other potential 
security threats that may serve as deterrents to travel.  There are four potential instigators of 
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security threats that may cause tourists to avoid a travel destination: 1) crime-related incidents; 2) 
terrorism; 3) war; 4) and civil/political unrest (Pizam, 2006).  Terrorism, war and civil/political 
unrest and other violent occurrences are often linked and classified under political instability by 
researchers.  Crime-related incidents are important, but not collectively included or considered in 
terms of its relationship to tourism demand as politically stability (Ghaderi et al, 2017).  
However, crime-related incidents or the perception that a destination has a high level of crime 
could potentially render a destination as unsafe.   
Findings on crime rates and tourism indicate that theft is often the widely reported crime 
against tourists (Glensor and Peak, 2004).  However, in the event tourists do not report crimes 
against them, crime rate levels will indicate the overall safety of the travel destination.  Crimes 
against tourists typically occur in areas that experience higher overall crime rates.  Travelers are 
at risk to other crimes in addition to thefts such as assaults, homicides, robberies, scams and 
credit card fraud.  Furthermore, the assessment of crime rate levels indicates the effectiveness of 
the government providing tourism security (Glensor and Peak, 2004).  To address the gap in the 
literature that singularly addresses the impact of political stability on tourism demand and the 
lack of studies on the level of crime rates and tourism demand, I develop the public safety 
variable that includes the measurement of crime rates as well as political stability. 
2.2 Infrastructure Investment Theory 
Previous literature has measured investment in public infrastructure through 
infrastructure rankings that assess the quality of a nation’s infrastructure.  Undoubtedly, a quality 
and modern infrastructure is an important driver of tourism development (Sakai, 2007; Jovanovic 
and Ilic, 2016) because infrastructure facilitates the commerce of tourism (Sakai, 2007).  
Infrastructure makes the private distribution of tourism services more efficient as all forms of 
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transportation infrastructure (road, air and sea) are important for travel to and within a 
destination - especially for countries with remote attractions to offer.  Moreover, overnight 
tourists serve as temporary residents of a destination; therefore, the demand for physical 
infrastructure such as water, sewer, electricity and communication is also important for 
investment.  Public infrastructure is a fundamental function of the government (Hodge and 
Greve, 2017), who will allocate public capital on infrastructure if tourism is intended to be a vital 
part of the country’s economy (2017).   
The level of public expenditures the government allocates is directly correlated with its 
intention to actively develop its infrastructure (Sakai, 2007; Jovanovic and Ilic, 2016).  In 
addition to public investment in infrastructure, it is important that the private sector is given 
incentives to invest in infrastructure.  While the state is directly responsible for transportation 
and environmental infrastructure, social tourism infrastructure (rooms to accommodate tourists 
and other supportive physical structures that facilitate activities and services to attract tourists 
such as hotels, stadiums, convention centers and galleries) (Jovanavic and Ilic, 2016).  Social 
infrastructure, as part of the overall tourism infrastructure framework, requires extensive 
investment from the private sector (Jovanavic and Ilic, 2016).   Vives, Benavides, and Paris 
(2010, p. 412) contend that nearly all public infrastructure endeavors will need the participation 
of the public and private sectors; therefore, infrastructure projects are generally public-private 
partnerships.  To effectively assess the government’s role in building and improving 
infrastructure, I will use government’s spending on infrastructure and private sector investment 
(including public-private partnerships in infrastructure) as the measurements for the 
infrastructure investment variable.    
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2.3 Nation Branding Theory 
Nation branding has been a challenge for scholars to define and measure.  The dispute on 
the conceptualization and operationalization has led to the creation of a country brand index 
which is more of a measurement of country image quality than it is on effective branding efforts.  
This paper bypasses the debate on how branding is operationalized to provide a simpler 
measurement for tourism promotions.  The goal of nation branding is for countries to self-
evaluate, conduct a situation analysis of the country’s strengths and weaknesses, and recognize 
what needs to be achieved to make the country more attractive as a destination (Nawaz & 
Hassan, 2016).  For countries, this involves investing heavily in the factors that drive tourism, 
developing policies to encourage tourism and then promoting the country brand through 
marketing initiatives.   
  I will focus on how much public and private investment has been allocated to marketing 
promotions as the measurement for nation branding, including favorable policies that encourage 
tourism development.  The public sector is responsible for building a country brand image and 
the promotion of its tourism sector outside of the country (Nawaz & Hassan, 2016).  The level of 
capital investment from the public and private sectors signifies the priority governments place on 
building a positive image of their country.  At the beginning of tourism development, 
government authorities from the national and regional level take a primary leadership role 
promoting tourism.  To that end, the government is the pioneer in all facets of tourism 
development including marketing endeavors (Nawaz & Hassan, 2016).  However, as tourism 
successfully develops through later stages, effective nation branding causes the public sector to 
partner with the private sector in its nation branding efforts (Göymen, 2000; Mckercher & 
Ritchie, 1997; Nawaz & Hassan, 2016).  The evidence of public sector expenditures on tourism 
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marketing and public-private sector partnerships to promote tourism will serve as the variables 
that comprise nation branding in this paper. 
2.4 Country Image Perception (Intervening Variable) 
Country image perception is discussed in numerous scholarly reports on tourism 
development.  This is because the perception of a country can contribute to its overall reputation 
over time in the mass tourism market based on the continual information potential travelers 
receive.  The perception of a country’s image ultimately influences travelers’ decision to visit 
that destination.  For travelers, a strong positive country brand image projecting a destination’s 
appeal will likely create a higher demand for travel to that destination over other possible 
destinations with weaker and negative brand images (Ezeudiji et al, 2016).        
Country image perception is often caused by the image projected to and developed 
emotionally by travelers (Lopes, 2011; Rajesh, 2013; Ezeudiji et al, 2016).  The traveler’s 
perception derives from direct travel experiences (Lopes, 2011; Ezeudiji et al, 2016) or from 
external information sources about a destination (Tasci & Gartner, 2007; Ezeudiji et al, 2016) 
that is then conveyed to the public.  The destination travel information may take the form of a 
traveler’s country travel warning reports, mass media reports or by public comments made 
available to them from seemingly credible sources such as, for example, United States’ president 
Donald Trump’s “shithole” comment about Haiti.  The information received about a destination, 
which affect tourist perceptions, are exogenous to the inbound travel destination; and, therefore, 
they are beyond the destination’s control.  However, there are internal country image 
management strategies, in the form of nation branding, that destinations can implement to 
influence how their country is perceived.   
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Country image perception originates from tourism demand based on a traveler’s desire 
for destination attractiveness.  Therefore, for a tourist destination, its supply (or its country’s 
brand essence) must project a positive country image to satisfy tourism demand.  Crouch (2011) 
stated that it is up to the country to supply destination attractiveness, which is comprised of 
important elements: “the reality of the destination’s attributes and qualities (destination’s 
appeal), and how this reality is communicated to and perceived by tourists (destination’s 
knowledge and understanding), in comparison to the other information received about other 
destinations” (Crouch, 2011; as discussed in Ezeuduji et al, 2016).  The country’s brand essence 
provides the “functional and emotional benefits of a brand” (de Chernatony & Harris, 2010 as 
discussed in Ezeuduji et al, 2016) as well as establishes the country’s competitive advantage over 
its potential competitors in the mass tourism market.  As the costs associated with travel are large 
and infrequent, potential travelers will likely choose a destination with a positive image over one 
that is unfavorable; and, they will favor the destination that can offer the functional and 
emotional benefits demanded for traveling outside of their usual habitat (Ezeudiji et al, 2016).  
While the emotional benefits (i.e. visiting family, attending business events, sight-seeing and 
visiting attractions) (Ezeuduji et al, 2016) are acknowledged, the focus of this paper will be on 
the functional advantages that the destination can supply to meet a tourist’s demand.  The 
functional benefits are tangible in nature, serve as the basis for a destination’s appeal and 
positive country image; and those benefits are comprised of a country’s physical characteristics 
such as tourism security, quality infrastructure and facilities (Pawitra & Tan, 2003; Vengesayi, 
2003; Ezeudiji et al, 2016). Ultimately, to match tourism demand and exceed traveler’s 
destination costs, destinations need to provide a balance of functional and emotional advantages 
by producing a positive country brand.    
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2.5 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (Dependent Variable) Theory 
Tourism demand is often measured in the literature by “international arrivals” per year 
indicating overnight stays or “international visitors per year” that includes all visitor types (i.e. 
cruise arrivals) if overnight arrival data is unavailable.  For the purposes of this paper, I will 
expand on most of the literature’s operationalization of tourism demand and create a new 
dependent variable called “tourism arrivals and receipts”.  Tourism arrivals and receipts will 
consist of two components: 1) the international arrivals per year and b) international receipts per 
year.  Considering the case studies of this thesis will conduct analysis over a time series, over 
which one of the test countries departed the mass tourism market to evolve into a niche tourism 
market (which includes an extensive cruise tourism sector), it is important to evaluate the actual 
growth rates of tourism over time.   
Figure 2.1 below provides a visual overview of the theoretical framework of this paper 
and how the independent variables interact with country image perception to generate increases 
in tourism arrivals and receipts. 
 
Figure 2-1 Theoretical Model- How the Independent Variables Interact with the 
Intervening Variable to Increase Tourism Arrivals and Receipts 
25 
2.6 Independent Variables 
2.6.1 Public Safety (IV1) 
a. Conceptual definition: State security measures taken to protect people against safety 
and security risks such as crime and unintended consequences of an involuntary nature 
such as political instability1.  Two variables make up public safety, the main independent 
variable of this paper; and they are namely, crime rates and political stability. 
1. Crime rates— Crime rate is the total crimes complied to “assess the effectiveness 
of a crime control policy, and the impact of the policy on the risk of crime 
victimization”2.  
2. Political stability— Following Hurwitz, political stability is: “(1) the absence of 
violence; governmental longevity/duration; (3) the existence of a legitimate 
constitutional (4) the absence of structural change; and (5) a multifaceted societal”3 
b. Operationalization:   Public Safety (IV1) will be measured using several data sources 
for the 1940-2017 period that covers the entire tourism cycles for the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti.   
Crime rates—I will measure crime rates for the Dominican Republic and Haiti, from 
1940 -1999 using information gathered from: 1) Country Study on the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti produced by the Federal Research Division of the Library of 
Congress (Library of Congress, 2001) which contains a discussion of major crime 
incidents (such as homicides, assaults, thefts and robberies, drug trafficking related 
                                                 
1  Public safety definition—is my conceptual definition based on a combination of definitions from the tourism determinants literature 
defining safety and security.  My conceptual definition is derived from this link: 
https://erl.ucc.edu.gh/jspui/bitstream/123456789/3157/1/GETRUDE%20POKU.pdf 
2  Crime rate definition—https://definitions.uslegal.com/c/crime-rate/  
3 Political stability definition— Hurwitz, L. (1973). Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability. Comparative Politics, 5(3), 449-
463. doi:10.2307/421273 
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crime and rape).  From 1995-2010, for the Dominican Republic, I will use the 
indicators from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).   The 
UNODC measure is the number of intentional homicides (which is generally used in 
the literature on crime to measure crime rate level in many countries); and, intentional 
homicide is defined as unlawful death purposefully inflicted on a person by another 
person.   From 2011-2017, I will use the number of intentional homicides data available 
in the Overseas Security Advisory Center (OSAC) Reports on Dominican Republic.  
For Haiti, from 1999-2016, I will use the UNODC data on intentional homicides 
(available from 1999-2012) and use the U.N. MINUSTAH Audit Reports (for the 2013-
2017 period) that reported data on intentional homicides.   
For 1940-2017, much of the public safety (IV1) data on crime rates and political 
stability for the Dominican Republic and Haiti, is unavailable or sporadic.  For both 
countries, published statistics for both indexes were instituted in the mid-1990’s.  
Furthermore, numerous international organizations assert that crime rates in the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti have been underreported (Library of Congress, 2001; 
OSAC, 2007-2018; MINUSTAH, 2012).  As a result, I am using the more readily 
available international homicide rates to indicate crime levels where statistics on other 
types of crime which affect tourists (robberies and thefts, assaults, kidnappings, and 
rape) are widely unavailable for the time discussed in this paper.  Due to the unreliable 
or missing data for the public safety (IV1), I have developed the following subjective 
judgment operationalization:  
IV1(A) Public safety/crime rates –To distinguish between low and high crime rate 
levels, I will implement a scale of low, moderate, high and critical.   
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For crime rates preceding the time where actual numbers were reported (1940-1994), I 
will use the information discussed in the Library of Congress Report on the level of 
crime in Haiti and the Dominican Republic (2001) to assign the level of crime rate.  For 
crime rate data that was reported in numbers during 1995-2017, the crime rate category 
will be based on the number of international homicides reported.  The higher the 
number of international homicides reported, the more unsafe the country.  The 
Overseas Security Advisory Center (OSAC -
https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=22180) provides a 
description for each level of crime rate: 
“Low”—indicates that there is low threat of crime and for reported international 
homicide numbers of 0-500; “Moderate”—indicates that the threat of crime is 
moderate, and there is some crime but it is less likely to occur and for reported 
international homicide rates of 501-1,000; “High”—indicates that the threat of crime is 
high, common and there is a likely chance of occurrence and for international homicide 
rates of 1001-2000; and  “Critical” – the highest level – indicates that the threat of 
crime is very common, very high, imminent and very likely to occur, and for 
international homicide rates of 2001-above.  The lower the level of crime rate, the 
higher the public safety level  
Political stability—I will measure political stability for the Dominican Republic and 
Haiti, from 1940 -1999 using information gathered from: 1) Country Study on the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti produced by the Federal Research Division of the 
Library of Congress (Library of Congress, 2001) which contains information on the 
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periods of political stability/instability for each country4.  For 1996-2017, I will 
measure political stability using the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) project that reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for over 200 
countries and territories over the period 1996–2016, for six dimensions of governance 
solely focusing on the political stability and absence of violence statistics as the 
measure for political stability 5.  The WGI percentile rank indicators for political 
stability and absence of violence/terrorism “measures perceptions of the likelihood of 
political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism” 
(http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=1181&series=PV.PER.RNK).  
Percentile rank indicates the rank of a country among all countries that are covered by 
the indicator.  “0” corresponds to the lowest rank and “100” to the highest rank.   
Due to the unreliable or missing rank data for the public safety (IV1) prior to 1995, I 
have developed the following subjective judgment operationalization:  
IV1(B) Public safety/political stability— To distinguish between the lowest percentile 
rank and highest percentile rank of political stability in each test country, I will 
implement a scale of stable, moderate, and unstable.  Expanding on the WGI’s 
percentile rank measurement definition, a percentile rank of “0-49” corresponds to 
unstable (active incidents of violence, political unrest and political instability); a 
percentile rank of “50-89” corresponds to moderately stable (no major incidents, there 
may be some random political unrest or temporary instability incidents); and a 
percentile rank of “90-100” corresponds to stable (no threat of major incidents, political 
                                                 




5 Political stability measurement (1996-present): http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home 
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unrest, violence and political instability is unlikely).  For political stability information 
during the period, 1940-1994, I will assign the level of stability from the information 
reported in the Library of Congress Report on Haiti and the Dominican Republic 
(2001).  For political stability that was reported in country rank figures by the WGI 
from 1995-2016, the closer the percentile rank of the country is to 100, the more stable 
the country.  The more politically stable the country, the higher the public safety level  
Public Safety (IV1) Hypothesis - The lower the level of crime rates and the more 
political stable the country, the higher the public safety which produces a positive 
country image perception that attracts more tourism arrivals and receipts 
2.6.2 Infrastructure Investment (IV2) 
a. Conceptual definition:   the public and private spending on all the facilities used to deliver 
energy, water, sanitation, telecommunication and transport (land, air, and sea)6.  Two 
variables make up infrastructure investment, a main independent variable of this paper; and 
they are namely, public spending on infrastructure and private sector investment in 
infrastructure. 
1. Public spending on infrastructure— state, regional and local spending on 
infrastructure services. Infrastructure is defined to cover six sectors: irrigation, 
energy (primarily power), transport, communication, wastewater management, 
and water supply7 
2. Private sector investment in infrastructure— capital investments in infrastructure 
in the form of a) full privatization or stand alone in infrastructure developments 
                                                 
6 Infrastructure investment definition: The conceptual definition comes from a World Bank report on infrastructure (2006) at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTDECABCTOK2006/Resources/Antonio_Estache_Infrastructure_for_Growth.pdf 
7 Public spending on infrastructure: The conceptual definition comes from the Public Spending on Infrastructure guide available at the 
World Bank website: https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-5905 
30 
or projects; or b) public-private partnerships (PPPs), which are partnerships 
between public sector organizations and private sector investors and business for 
the purpose of designing, planning, financing, constructing, providing and/or 
operating infrastructure, facilities or related services8 
b. Operationalization:   Infrastructure investment (IV2) will be measured using several 
data sources for the 1940-2017-time period that covers the entire tourism cycles for the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti.   
Public spending on infrastructure—I will measure public spending on infrastructure in 
the Dominican Republic, from 1940 - 2016 using information provided on government 
spending on infrastructure (energy, water, sanitation, telecommunication and transport 
(land, air, and sea)), gathered from the following sources: 1) 2001 Country Study on the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti produced by the Federal Research Division of the Library 
of Congress (for the time period 1940-2001); 2) IMF Working Paper, 2007 (for the time 
period 2002-2006)9 and 3) Tourism Development in the Dominican Republic article 
(Duffy et al, 2016) (for the time period 2007-2016).  For Haiti, I will measure public 
spending in infrastructure using the following sources: 1) 2001 Country Study on the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti produced by the Federal Research Division of the Library 
of Congress (for the period 1940-2001); and 2) CFI Invest in Haiti statistics (for the 
period 2014-2018). 
                                                 
8 Private sector investment in infrastructure definition: The conceptual definition for private sector investment in infrastructure comes 
from the World Economic Forum Infrastructure Investment Participation Blueprint (Wyman, 2014); and Public Private Partnerships 
(PPP) definition: The conceptual definition for PPP comes from Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation report: 
http://www.cpppc.org/u/cms/ppp/201711/30162729estl.pdf 
9 Public and PPP information: (D.R. 1940-2001): http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a242550.pdf; 9  
and Country Studies on Dominican Republic, 1999: http://countrystudies.us/dominican-republic/37.htm: 
http://countrystudies.us/dominican-republic/37.htm; (IMF Working Paper, Jaramillo and Sancak, 2007), 2007; 1990-2017: 
https://pppknowledgelab.org/countries/dominican-republic 
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Due to the unreliable or missing rank data for the IV2(A) infrastructure 
investment/public spending on infrastructure prior to 2018, I have developed the 
following subjective judgment operationalization:  
IV2(A) Infrastructure investment/public spending on infrastructure: –To distinguish 
between low and high infrastructure investment levels, I will implement a scale of low, 
moderate, and high.  For the period 1940-2017 for the Dominican Republic and Haiti, 
specific capital investment was not readily available for the entire period.  However, 
based on information provided by the reports on public spending mentioned above on 
public infrastructure building and improvements, a classification can be made on the 
level of infrastructure investment for this period.  For capital investments in infrastructure 
that was available, the categories covered under the scale for public spending on 
infrastructure are as follows: a “low” level investment (in millions) corresponds to $0-
500; a “moderate” level investment corresponds to $501-1,000; and a “high” level 
investment corresponds to $1,001-above.  The higher the level of public spending on 
infrastructure, the higher the infrastructure investment.  
Private sector investment in infrastructure—I will measure private sector investment in  
the Dominican Republic, from 1940 - 2017 using information provided on a) public-
private partnerships for investment in energy, water, sanitation, telecommunication and 
transport (land, air, and sea) infrastructure (PPI); and b) the number of hotel rooms, 
representing tourism physical infrastructure, gathered from the following sources: 1) 
2001 Country Study on the Dominican Republic and Haiti produced by the Federal 
Research Division of the Library of Congress (for the time period 1940-2001); 2) IMF 
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Working Paper, 2007 (for the time period 2002-2006)10 ; 3) The Seaside Resorts in the 
Dominican Republic; A Typology journal article (Myer-Arendt, 1992); 4) Tourism in the 
Dominican Republic Project Paper (Barrera et al, 2007); 5) Tourism Development in the 
Dominican Republic: An examination of the impact on coastal households (Duffy et al, 
2016); and 6) PPP capital investment data (in millions USD) from the PPP Knowledge 
Lab: https://pppknowledgelab.org/ (for the time period 1990-2017).  For Haiti, I will 
measure private sector investment in infrastructure for the time period 1940 - 1990 using 
information provided on a) public-private partnerships for investment in energy, water, 
sanitation, telecommunication and transport (land, air, and sea) infrastructure; and b) the 
number of hotel rooms, gathered from the following sources: 1) 2001 Country Study on 
the Dominican Republic and Haiti produced by the Federal Research Division of the 
Library of Congress; 2)  The Haitian Dilemma journal article (Preeg, 1996); Reviving 
Haiti’s Paradise journal article (Luxner, 1999); and 4) PPP capital investment data (in 
millions USD) from the PPP Knowledge Lab: https://pppknowledgelab.org/ (for the time 
period 1990-2017). 
Due to the unreliable or missing data for IV2(B) Infrastructure Investment/ Private sector 
investment in infrastructure, I have developed the following subjective judgment 
operationalization:  
IV2(B) Infrastructure Investment/Private sector investment in infrastructure— I will 
implement a scale of low, moderate, and high to indicate a) the level of public-private 
partnerships in infrastructure (PPI) and a scale of low, moderate, high and very high to 
                                                 
10 Public and PPP information: (D.R. 1940-2001): http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a242550.pdf; 10  
and Country Studies on Dominican Republic, 1999: http://countrystudies.us/dominican-republic/37.htm: 
http://countrystudies.us/dominican-republic/37.htm; Seaside Resort article (Meyer-Ardent et al, 1992); Tourism in D.R. Report 
(Barrera et al, 2007); and Tourism Development article (Duffy et al, 2015); Jaramillo and Sancak, 2007; 1990-2017: 
https://pppknowledgelab.org/countries/dominican-republic 
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indicate b) the level of hotel rooms investment that funded infrastructure projects and 
hotel developments between 1940-2017.  For PPIs, the World Bank’s PPI Database 
reports capital investment in infrastructure in millions (USD).  Based on information 
provided by the World Bank’s PPP Knowledge Lab, a “low” level investment (in 
millions) corresponds to $0-500; a “moderate” level investment corresponds to $501-
1,000; and a “high” level investment corresponds to $1,001-above.  The higher the level 
of PPP investment in infrastructure, the higher the infrastructure investment.  For the 
level of hotel rooms investment, a “low” number of hotel rooms corresponds to 0-7,999; 
a “moderate” level investment corresponds to 8,000-19,999; a “high” level investment 
corresponds to 20,000-49,999; and a “very high” level investment corresponds to 
“50,000-above”. 
Infrastructure Investment (IV2) Hypothesis – The higher the level of public spending 
and private sector investment in infrastructure, the higher the investment in infrastructure 
which produces a positive country image perception that attracts tourism arrivals and 
receipts 
2.6.3 Nation Branding (IV3) 
a. Conceptual definition:   Defined as the coordinated government efforts to manage a 
country’s image in order to promote tourism, investment and foreign relations11 (Volcic 
& Andrejevic, 2011.  Nation branding consists of two variables:  
1. Public tourism promotion investment— National, regional and local government 
expenditures spent to advance tourism promotional activities including tourism 
                                                 
11 Volcic, Z., & Andrejevic, M. (2011). Nation branding in the era of commercial nationalism. International Journal of 
Communication, 5, 21. 
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promotion, marketing, visitor information services, administrative and other 
public services related to tourism development12. 
2. Public-private tourism promotion partnership— a partnership between the public 
and private sector to develop, position and execute destination branding, tourism 
promotion and marketing activities13 
b.  Operationalization:   The nation branding (IV3) will be measured using several data 
sources for the 1940-2017-time period that covers the entire tourism cycles for the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti.     
Public tourism promotion investment—During the period 1940-1994, I will measure 
public tourism promotion investment using a compilation of information on public 
tourism marketing investment available from the following sources as follows: 1) for the 
Dominican Republic, I will use a) Country Report on Haiti and the Dominican Republic, 
2001 and Tourism Development in the Dominican Republic (Fuller, 1999) (for the time 
period covering 1940-1980); b) (Fuller, 1999), The International Women’s Rights Action 
Watch Report on the Dominican Republic, The Dominican Republic: Defying the Odds 
Report (Henderson, 2011), The Tourism Cluster Report, 2012; Caribbean Resource and 
Development Centre Report, 1988 (for the time period 1981-2011); and c) WEF Travel 
and Tourism Report, 2012-2018; Ministry of Tourism Report (2010) (for the time period 
2011-2017); and  
                                                 
12 Public tourism promotion investment definition: —the conceptual definition is based on the World Trade and Tourism Council’s 
definition on government collective spending: https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impact-research/regions-
2017/world2017.pdf 
13 Public-private tourism promotion partnership definition— is my conceptual definition based on the World Travel and Tourism 
Council discussion on private sector’s marketing role in conjunction with the public sector 
http://www.ontit.it/opencms/export/sites/default/ont/it/documenti/archivio/files/ONT_2003-08-13_00163.pdf 
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2) for Haiti, I will use a) the Development Associates, Inc, Tourism Specialist Report, 
1986, the World Bank Country Report on Haiti, 1987, and the Library of Congress 
Country Report, 2001 (for the period 1940-1994). 
For the Dominican Republic and Haiti, for the period 1995 – 2017, I will measure 
public tourism promotion investment using the “government spending on travel and 
tourism percentage” statistics from the World Bank’s World Trade and Tourism Council 
data set14.  The figures include a percentage of total tourism expenditures of local and 
regional government individual spending on the indices used to assess nation branding 
for tourism development such as tourism marketing, visitor information services, 
administrative services and other public services associated with tourism promotion.  The 
World Economic Forum that produces the Travel and Tourism annual reports by country 
indicate that the percentage is used to determine the level of priority that governments 
give to travel and tourism promotion.   
Due to the unreliable or missing rank data for the IV3(A) nation branding/public 
tourism promotion investment prior to 2017, I have developed the following subjective 
judgment operationalization:  
IV3(A) nation branding/public tourism promotion investment: To distinguish 
between low and high public tourism promotion investment levels, I will implement a 
scale of low, moderate, and high.  For the period 1940-1994, for the Dominican Republic 
and Haiti, public tourism promotion investment financial statistics were not readily 
available for the entire period.  However, based on information provided by the reports 
on public tourism promotion investment mentioned above on government investment in 




tourism promotion, a classification can be made on the level of tourism promotion 
investment from the public sector for this time.  For the period 1995-2018, I used the 
“government spending on travel and tourism percentage” statistics from the World 
Bank’s World Trade and Tourism Council to determine the percentage levels for the 
nation branding/tourism promotion investment’s “low-moderate and high” scale in 
conjunction with the World Trade Council’s methodology for investment level.  A “low” 
level was based on a percentage of 0-9% of total tourism expenditures on public tourism 
promotion; a “moderate” level investment was based on a percentage of 10-19% of total 
tourism expenditures on public tourism promotion; and a “high” level investment was 
based on a percentage of 20%-up of total tourism expenditures on public tourism 
promotion.  The higher the level of public tourism promotion investment, the more 
effective the nation branding.   
Public-private tourism promotion partnership— During the period 1940-2017, I 
will measure public-private tourism promotion investment using a compilation of 
information on public-private tourism promotion partnerships available from the 
following sources as follows: 1) for the Dominican Republic, I will use a) the UN Treaty 
data on Dominican Republic, 1982;  Tourism Development in the Dominican Republic 
(Fuller, 1999); Ministry of Tourism Report (2010) and WEF Travel and Tourism Report, 
2011-2018 (for the time period 1940-2017); b) ; 2) for Haiti, I will use the Development 
Associates, Inc, Tourism Specialist Report, 1986, the World Bank Country Report on 
Haiti, 1987, the Library of Congress Country Report, 2001, the IADB Haiti Country 
Report-Developing the North Department, 2016 and WEF Travel and Tourism Report, 
2013-2018 (for the period 1940-2017). 
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Due to the unreliable or missing rank data for the IV3(B) nation branding/public -private 
tourism promotion partnerships from 1940-2017, I have developed the following 
subjective judgment operationalization:  
IV3(B) nation branding/public-private tourism promotion partnerships:  I will implement 
a scale of low, moderate, and high.  For the period 1940-2011, for the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti, public-private tourism promotion partnership spending data was not 
available for the entire period.  However, based on information provided by the reports 
on public-private partnerships for tourism promotion, a classification can be made on the 
level of tourism promotion investment for this time.  The higher the level of investment 
of public-private sector tourism promotion partnerships, the more effective the nation 
branding strategy   
Nation Branding (IV3) Hypothesis: The higher the level of public tourism promotion 
investment and public-private partnerships, the higher the nation branding which 
produces a positive country image perception that attracts tourism arrivals and receipts 
2.7 Intervening Variable 
2.7.1 Country Image Perception 
a. Conceptual definition of intervening variable:   the sum of beliefs, ideals, and 
impressions people have toward a certain country based on interpreted information 
received regardless of the nation’s real character15.  In this paper, country image 
perception is measured by travel destination information. 
                                                 
15 Country image perception—the conceptual definition is developed following a combination of concepts from the country image 
literature (Nagashimu, 1970; Shields, 1991; Martin and Eroglu, 1993; and Haider et al, 1994) 
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b. Conceptual definition of Travel Destination Information (TDI): interpreted 
information received by potential visitors about a country from secondary (induced, 
organic and autonomous information compiled from other people or through 
organizations) sources that creates a perceived image of the country as a travel 
destination and influences potential visitors’ travel behavior16. 
 Mass media reports—is a diversified collection of media technologies, in the form 
of print, digital, and broadcast, that provides information to a wide public 
audience17. 
 Travel guides— A printed or digital book that provides information and advice 
about the culture, history, geographical location, accommodations, restaurants, 
attractions, transportation and activities of travel destinations to actual or potential 
visitors or tourists18 
 Travel destination surveys— Travel destination survey is a detailed investigative 
study of a travel market, destination or geographical area used to collect data on 
attitudes, impressions, opinions, preferences, satisfaction level by polling a 
section of the population19 
                                                 
16 Travel destination information (TDI)—the conceptual definition is developed through a combination of concepts from the following 
source: Marine-Roig, E. (2017). Measuring Destination Image through Travel Reviews in Search Engines. Sustainability, 9(8), 1425. 
doi:10.3390/su9081425 
17 Mass media reports—the conceptual definition is developed using a combination of definition and concepts from the following 
sources: ScienceDaily-https://www.sciencedaily.com/terms/mass_media.htm; and Park, 2015: Park, Jihwan, "The Impact of Different 
Types of Media on Tourists' Behavioral Intentions" (2015). FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1757. 
http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/1757 
18 Travel guides—the conceptual definition is developed by me using a combination of concepts from the following sources: 
Cockburn-Wootten, C., Friend, L., & McIntosh, A. (2006). A discourse analysis of representational spaces: Writings of women 
independent travellers. Tourism, 54(1), 7-16.  
https://www.rezdy.com/resource/travel-tourism-glossary/ 
https://www.worldtravelguide.net/ 
19 Travel destination surveys—the conceptual definition is developed using a combination of concepts from:  
    OECD-https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2620 
Bennett C, Khangura S, Brehaut JC, Graham ID, Moher D, Potter BK, et al. (2011) Reporting Guidelines for Survey Research: An 
Analysis of Published Guidance and Reporting Practices. PLoS Med 8(8): e1001069. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001069 
39 
 Travel reviews—subjective published accounts by visitors of a travel destination 
that offer potential travelers with information about the travel destination, 
including opinions about the country, its attractions and amenities, hotel 
accommodations, restaurants and other country travel information based on the 
travel review writer’s first-hand experience20 
 Country safety rankings— indices of compiled and analyzed data from public 
sources that rank the world’s countries by safety21 
c. Operationalization: The more favorable the travel destination information (mass media 
reports, surveys, travel reviews and country safety rankings), the more positive a 
potential traveler’s perception of a country’s image as a viable travel destination.  For the 
test countries, Dominican Republic and Haiti, I will measure country image perception 
using travel destination information as referenced in Appendix U. 
2.8 Dependent Variable 
2.8.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts 
a. Conceptual definition:   the total number of people who travel or desire to travel, and 
the total amount of money they spend to use tourist facilities and services at their travel 
destination -which is located away from their places of work or residence 22.  Tourism 
arrivals and receipts are comprised of 1) the number of international tourism arrivals; and 
2) international tourism receipts per year. 
                                                 
20 Travel reviews—the conceptual definition is based on my research on travel reviews (source: Trip Advisor report 
https://www.tripadvisor.com/pdfs/OnlineTravelReviewReport.pdf) and my own understanding of the purpose of travel reviews. 
21 Country safety rankings-- the conceptual definition is based on indices on safety rankings: 
Safe Around: https://safearound.com/danger-rankings/ 
22 Tourism growth –the reference to tourism growth is based on an expansion of Cooper et al., 1993 (Cooper, C., Fletcher, J., Gilbert, 
D., & Wanhill, S. (1993), "Tourism: principles & practice", Longman: Harlow, UK.)  definition on tourism demand.  I combine the 
two common measurements of tourism demand namely, number of tourist arrivals and tourism receipts per year.  The number of 
arrivals and receipts over time is referred to as each country’s overall tourism growth. 
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1. Number of international tourism arrivals23-- Refers exclusively to: 
a. Tourists (overnight visitors) i.e. a visitor who stays at least one night in a 
collective or private accommodation in the country visited. Same-day visitors 
are not included. 
b. The number of arrivals - not to the number of persons. The same person who 
makes several trips to a given country during a given period will be counted as 
a new arrival each time, as well as a person who travels through several 
countries on one trip is counted as a new arrival each time. 
2. International tourism receipts per year (ITRs)24-- ITRs are receipts earned by a 
destination country from inbound tourism.  The ITRs scope: 
a. ITRs cover all tourism receipts resulting from expenditure made by 
visitor arrivals from abroad. 
b. Include the receipts generated by overnight as well as by same-day trips. 
c. But exclude the receipts related to international transport contracted by 
residents of other countries (for instance ticket receipts from foreigners 
travelling with a national company) 
b. Operationalization: For the dependent variable, tourism arrivals and receipts, in the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti I will use World Bank data for the two measurements of 
tourism arrivals and receipts: a) “number of international tourism arrivals” and b) 
“international tourism receipts per year” available at 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ST.INT.RCPT.CD for the period 1995-2017.  For 
the number of international tourism arrivals and international receipts per year data, prior 
                                                 
23 Number of international tourism arrivals is defined by the UNWTO World Tourism Organization 
24 International tourism receipts is defined by the UNWTO World Tourism Organization 
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to 1995 (1960-1994), I will use statistics compiled from the following sources: a) for 
Haiti: The Political Economy of Survival Reduced Haiti (Fass, 1990); The Library of 
Congress Country Report on Haiti and Dominican Republic, 2001; and b) for the 
Dominican Republic: The Library of Congress Country Report on Haiti and Dominican 
Republic, 2001; Tourism Development in the Dominican Republic (Fuller, 1999); 
Economic Growth Data Report on the Caribbean (1980-1986); and the Dominican 
Republic Tourism Report (1979-1992).  The higher the number of international tourism 
arrivals and the higher the international tourism receipts per year, the higher the increases 
in tourism arrivals and receipts. 
To make comparisons of annual or period growth for each measurement of my dependent 
variable, tourism arrivals and receipts, I calculate the growth rate in terms of percentage 
growth.  For the calculation, I used the Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) 
method25 to calculate the growth rate either annually or per tourism period (depends on 
the available years for statistics on arrivals and receipts), for each test country; and, then I 
calculated the growth rate either yearly (where available) by the entire tourism period (to 
show the total rate of growth for that time).  I divided the value of the arrivals and the 
receipts, respectively, at the end of the period in question by its value at the 
beginning of that period, raise the result to the power of one divided by the period length, 
and subtracted one from the subsequent result.  After the coversions, I developed a graphs 
to show the variation of tourism arrivals and receipts per period. 
Due to the unreliable or missing data for the DV-tourism arrivals and receipts/number of 
international tourism arrivals and international tourism receipts per year from 1940-1994, 
                                                 
25 https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cagr.asp 
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I have developed the following subjective judgment operationalization: The number of 
international tourism arrivals and international receipts will converted to the percentage 
rate of growth (either over time if there is a gap in years between figures or yearly if the 
available statistics are sequential.  A scale of low, moderate and high level will be 
assigned to DV(A) tourism arrivals and receipts/number of international arrivals as 
follows: After obtaining the growth rate by period, I compare the growth rate results to 
the average growth rate for that region during each period of time using data about the 
average growth rate from the Americas from the World Tourism Organization (from 
http://tourlib.net/wto/WTO_highlights_2000.pdf).  According to the 2000 World Tourism 
Organization Report (WTO, 2000), “Between 1950 and 1980 the number of international 
arrivals corresponded to an average growth rate of 7% for the Caribbean region.  My 
starting point for all tourism arrivals and receipts scales covering the tourism time periods 
in this paper (1940-2016) is to place any number under the “average growth rate” under 
the “low” category.  Any number within 2% over the average growth rate is “moderate” 
and 3% over the average growth rate is high.  The average tourism arrivals and receipts 
rate scale (for 1950-1980) is as follows: a “low” average tourism arrivals and receipts rate 
corresponds to 0-6.99%; a “moderate” average tourism arrivals and receipts rate 
corresponds to 7-9.99%; and a high average tourism arrivals and receipts rate 
corresponds to 10%-above.  According to the 2017 World Tourism Organization Report 
(WTO, 2017), the number of international arrivals in the Caribbean region for the period, 
1980-1995, corresponded to an average growth rate of 5 per cent.  For the average 
tourism arrivals and receipts rate scale (for 1980-1995): a “low” average growth rate of 
international arrivals corresponds to 0-4.99%; a “moderate” average growth rate of 
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international arrivals corresponds to 5-7.99%; and a “high” average growth rate of 
international arrivals corresponds to 8% - above.  Also, according to the 2017 World 
Tourism Organization Report (WTO, 2017), for the scale from 1995-2016, the number of 
international arrivals in the Caribbean region corresponded to an average annual growth 
rate of 2.7 per cent.  For the tourism arrivals and receipts rate scale (for 1995-2016): a 
“low” average growth rate of international arrivals corresponds to 0-2.69%; a “moderate” 
average growth rate of international arrivals corresponds to 2.7-4.99%; and a high 
average growth rate of international arrivals corresponds to 5%-above.   
For DV(B) tourism arrivals and receipts/number of international receipts per year, a scale 
of low, moderate and high level average tourism arrivals and receipts rate of receipts will 
be assigned as follows: For growth in yearly receipts, growth for the Caribbean was 
approximately 10% annually between 1940 and 1990 and the receipts from tourism were 
approximately 13% between 1990-2000.  For years that overlap, I multiply the average 
growth rate for each of the years that overlap by the number of years in each period of the 
overlap.  Subsequently, I add the overlapping year amounts and divide by the total 
number of years to get the average growth for the period.  Tourism receipt average 
growth rate fell in 2000 to 3.9% (Hills and Lundgren, 1977).  The average tourism 
arrivals and receipts rate scale for international annual receipts (1940-1990) is as follows: 
a “low” average growth rate of receipts corresponds to 0-9.99%; a “moderate” average 
growth rate of receipts tourism corresponds to 10-12.99%; and a high tourism arrivals 
and receipts corresponds to 13%-above.  The average tourism arrivals and receipts scale 
for international annual tourism receipts (for 1990-2000) is as follows: a “low” average 
growth rate of receipts corresponds to 12.99%; a “moderate” average growth rate of 
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receipts corresponds to13-17.99%; and a high average growth rate of receipts 
corresponds to 18%-above.  The average tourism arrivals and receipts scale for 
international annual tourism receipts (for 2000‐2016) is as follows: a “low” average 
growth rate of tourism receipts corresponds to 0-3.89%; a “moderate” average growth 
rate of tourism receipts corresponds to 3.9-5.99%; and a “high” average growth rate of 
tourism receipts corresponds to 6%-above.    
2.9 Methodology 
To investigate my question, I employ three qualitative comparative analysis case studies 
evaluating the theoretical arguments presented in this study.  I analyze the years when tourism 
was in the nascent stage of development in the two test countries, Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic, to the present (1940-2017), divided in block of twenty-year periods: 1940-1960; 1961-
1980; 1981-2000; and 2000-2017, for most of the variables in this paper.  The first case study is 
an evolution of Haiti’s tourism sector, a time series comparison evaluating the individual 
relationship between public safety, infrastructure investment and nation branding on tourism 
arrivals and receipts.  In addition, I also examine the interaction of the independent variables to 
create a positive country image that generates tourism arrivals and receipts.  The second case 
study conducts the same analysis on the Dominican Republic.  Finally, the third case study 
conducts a similar analysis in a comparative study between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.   
The statistics on the variables which comprise the independent (public safety, 
infrastructure investment and nation branding), interactive (country image perception) and 
dependent (tourism arrivals and receipts) variables of this study come from multiple data 
sources.  For the data on public safety comprised of crime rates and political stability percentile 
ranks for 1940-2017, I compile and organize the major crime incidents and threats to political 
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stability into the four periods of each test countries’ tourism development into tables and graphs 
that indicate the crime rate and political stability level (see Appendices A-D for Haiti and 
Appendices K-N for the Dominican Republic).  For the information on infrastructure investment 
comprised of public expenditures, private sector and public-private partnership capital 
investments in infrastructure for 1940-2017 (into the four tourism development time periods), I 
organize the data on infrastructure investments, classify the type of investment and the level of 
investments in tables and graphs (see Appendices E-F for Haiti and Appendices O-P for the 
Dominican Republic).  Likewise, for the information on nation branding comprised of public and 
private tourism promotion investment, I compile the data in tables and graphs for the tourism 
period and categorize the investment type and level for each of the test countries (see 
Appendices G-H for Haiti and Appendices Q-R for the Dominican Republic).   
For the interactive variable, country image perception, there were several forms of travel 
destination information sources (from mass media reports, travel guides, travel reviews and 
country safety rankings) that provided either favorable or unfavorable reviews of Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic, respectively.  I examined each of the data sources and provided a 
categorical scale for the country perception for Haiti and Dominican Republic divided in ten-
year time intervals covering 1940-2018 (see Appendix I for Haiti and Appendix S for the 
Dominican Republic).  Finally, the statistics for tourism arrivals and receipts for 1940-2017 were 
provided by the World Bank and various country reports on Haiti and the Dominican Republic or 
Caribbean regional reports.  I organized the raw data into spreadsheet and developed graphs to 
show the variation of tourism graph over designated tourism period covered in this paper.  Then, 
I assigned a scale level for international arrivals and receipts for each of the test countries (see 
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Appendices J for Haiti’s tourism arrivals and receipts and Appendices T for the Dominican 
Republic’s tourism arrivals and receipts).   
For each of the variables of this paper, scaled categories were defined as subjective 
judgements to compensate for either missing, unreliable or unreported information.  The scaled 
categories, for each variable, are compatible to make analysis of the relationship between them 
more transparent.  After the designating the scaled ratings for each variable, I compiled a final 
table comprised of all the variables of this paper and their corresponding rating for both test 
countries namely, Haiti and the Dominican Republic (see Tables 3.1 and 4.1 on the following 
pages).  I will use these tables as the basis for the three case study analyses.  
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Table 3.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts in Haiti (1940-2016): Scaled ratings based on 
analysis of data compiled for each variable 
 



































































































































































































































































                                                 
26 The names of each tourism period are loosely based on based on Hugues Séraphin’s 2016 study on marketing to diaspora community, which 
categorized the level of tourism that existed during those times 
27 Tourism growth (in terms of absolute numbers over time)—no figures available prior to tourism starting in Haiti in 1945 
28 The ratings for each scale are reported except as footnoted as there may be deviations in terms of how data sources report their scaled statistics 
inconsistent with the scales used in this report.  
29 OSAC (2012-2017) Reports on Haiti rated the crime level as “critical” in their scale whereas the scale of this study classifies it as “high” 
instead 
30 WGI indicators indicate levels of political stability for Haiti that would classify the country as “unstable”.  However, the indicator is based 
solely on measuring “absence of violence” as a security risk measurement; this indicator does not indicate the potential governance level which 
would provide a better measurement for stable government (such as governance and the effectiveness of its government institutions, rule of law 
and corruption levels 
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Table 4.1 Tourism arrivals and receipts in the Dominican Republic (1930-2016): Scaled 
ratings based on analysis of data compiled for each variable 
 






































































































































































































































3 ANALYSIS: COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES 
As indicated in the methodology section of this paper, I analyze the theory of this paper 
in this section and conduct hypothesis tests on two countries, Haiti and the Dominican Republic 
to determine if there is an impact tourism arrivals and receipts as predicted. 
                                                 
31 The ratings for each scale are reported except as footnoted as there may be deviations in terms of how data sources report their 
scaled statistics inconsistent with the scales used in this report.  
32 While tourism was non-existent in the Dominican Republic until 1971, this period is included to show overall variance with later 
periods; and to remain consistent with the period for comparison purposes with Haiti 
33 OSAC (2012-2017) Reports on the Dominican Republic rated the crime level as “high” (2001-2014) and then “critical” in their 
scale from 2015-2017 and the data on crime levels per homicides supports this rating 
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3.1 Haiti Tourism Case Study (1940-2017) 
3.1.1 Public Safety 
From the time that Haiti’s tourism sector began developing in the mid-1940s, the Haitian 
government continually declared that it was crime free up until 1986 when crime rates began 
rising considerably.  Tourists, prior to 1986, enjoyed attractions and resorts that were “virtually 
free of street crime” (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001).  Moreover, aside from 
instances where the country experienced political instability: 1) during 1956-57, when President 
Paul Magloire was overthrown for attempting to extend his constitutional term of office 
(Haggerty, 1989) and the country experienced five governments within a nine-month period; and 
2) during President Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier’s administration from 1962-1971, the country 
was moderately stable until Duvalier’s son, Jean Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier was overthrown 
in 1986 (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001; Haggerty, 1989).  Tourism arrivals and 
receipts was high through Haiti’s “Golden Tourism Period” (1940-1980), as it averaged a total 
growth rate of 14% for international arrivals and international receipts.  This figure was double 
the regional growth rate of 7% for international arrivals in the Caribbean; and, Haiti was also 
faring higher than the growth rates for international receipts which was 10% (see Appendices J.1 
and J.2).   As there were bouts of political instability, the rate of tourism arrivals and receipts (in 
terms of international arrivals as international receipts data is sporadic) slowed before picking 
back up in 1972 after Jean Claude Duvalier instituted many policies favoring private investment 
geared towards tourism development (Country Report, 2001).   
In 1945, when tourism started, Haiti’s international arrivals was 5,000.  By 1956, arrivals 
grew to 67,000 (nearly 5.5 times the amount of its 1950 figure-12,000 arrivals).  In 1963, during 
Francois Duvalier’s brutal dictatorship, the arrivals fell to under 50,000; but, they climbed to 
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over 159,000 by 1972 after Jean Claude Duvalier took office and kept rising until its peak in 
1979 with 338,900 (Figure 3.2).  From 1980-1986, during which political unrest was beginning 
to stir leading to Jean Claude Duvalier’s ouster in 1986, tourism arrivals and receipts remained at 
moderate levels; however, the number of arrivals was slowly declining while the tourism receipts 
from 1979-1984 was steadier (Figure 3.3).   
 
Figure 3-1 Political instability & international arrivals in Haiti (1945-1984) 
 
 










1945 1950 1956 1960 1963 1972 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Tourism Arrivals in Haiti (1945-1984)
F. Duvalier seizes 
power & has a 
violent regime 





- makes tourism a 
priority 
Rumor that AIDS 






Tourism starts (Haiti 









1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
▪ Political instability persists after "Baby Doc" 
Duvalier is overthrown (1986) 
▪ Haiti has 18 regime changes (between 1986 and 
2014)
▪ Crime increases 
▪ UN sends security forces (MINUSTAH: 2004-2017) to 
help manage crime (discovers crime is being 
underreported) & stability after Aristide is ousted; 






Figure 3-3 International receipts in Haiti between 1950-2015 
 
Following Jean-Claude Duvalier’s coup in 1986, a long-standing history of political 
instability began to plague Haiti.  The country had 18 regime changes of government between 
1986 and 2014 with former presidents Leslie Manigat ousted in a coup in 1988 and Jean 
Bertrand Aristide overthrown in 1991 (he was restored in 1994 and finished his term in 1996) 
and 2004 (after returning to power in 2001) (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001).  
Furthermore, since the crime rate levels were simultaneously rising around 1986 (and a rumor 
arose linking the origin of the AIDS virus to Haiti in 1982), tourism arrivals and receipts in terms 
of overnight visitors severely declined to stagnant levels. While Haiti’s cruise ship tourism began 
to significantly rise in the 2000s, the dynamics of Haiti’s tourism sector concerning overnight 
visitors transitioned from a mass tourism contender to a niche tourism market of diaspora, 
business and aid/missionary travelers.  Haiti’s inability to manage public safety since 1986 
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Haiti’s military forces, the Forces Armees d’Haiti (FAd’H), had been policing the 
country, as Haiti had no national police force until one was instituted in 1989 (Library of 
Congress Country Report, 2001).  Fad’H found itself unable to combat the severe security and 
crime the country was facing by the late 1980s was inadequate.  Despite the Haitian National 
Police (HNP) finally being instituted, managing crime has remained a major challenge for the 
country.  After Jean Bertrand Aristide’s coup in 2004, the United Nations sent peacekeeping 
forces (MINUSTAH) for 13 years to assist the HPN and bring stability to the country.  However, 
MINUSTAH’s legacy is a reported mixture of partial success and disaster.  The mission was 
blamed for bringing the cholera to the country post-Haiti’s 2010 earthquake and 134 members of 
MINUSTAH have been accused of sexual assault crimes (Johnston, 2017).  While MINUSTAH 
has been credited with restoring some stability (the slight rise of which is evident in Appendix D 
from 2009-2016), the country remains classified as “unstable” according to the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) measuring the likeliness of political instability and/or 
politically motivated violence.  Unfortunately, the classification was confirmed as Haiti’s recent 
bout of violent protests in Haiti stranded several missionary groups, mostly from the United 
States.   
A recent report by the U.S. Department of State on Haiti, indicates that the Haitian 
National Police has been underreporting the country’s crime rates.  The underreporting of crime 
insinuates that Haiti is statistically safer than its Caribbean counterparts (OSAC Report, 2018).  
Haiti, like many countries in its region, had not been providing reliable data on recorded crimes 
for several years.  In fact, recoding systems for crime reporting were not instituted in Haiti until 
2000 (UNODC Report, 2002).  For the last seven years that OSAC has reported on Haiti, the 
U.S. Department of State has been classifying Haiti’s crime rate levels as “critical” (OSAC 
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Reports, 2012-2018); however, the scale for crime rates in this paper classifies Haiti as “high” 
due to its reported homicide estimates from 1999-2016 as well as the limited data available for 
other forms of crime (see Table 3.1 in the Methodology section; and, Appendix A and B for 
Haiti’s specific crime rate information).           
3.1.2 Infrastructure Investment 
Haiti’s overall infrastructure has been considered poor quality and a deterrent to 
sustainable tourism in terms of increased overnight visitor arrivals (cruise ship travelers are often 
insulated from being impacted by infrastructure problems as the cruise lines are “all-inclusive” 
sea resorts where traveler’s do not remain overnight).  Prior to the advent of the country’s 
tourism sector in 1945, the United States was occupied in Haiti and invested extensively in 
building Haiti’s infrastructure in terms of roads, bridges, canals, public buildings, 
telecommunications, water and sewage.  This massive investment contributed to the start of the 
country’s tourism infrastructure.  By 1980, the public and public-private investment in 
infrastructure continued to grow with paved road projects constructed in Haiti’s major cities as 
well as the construction of an 80-mile from Port au Prince to Cap Hatien, i.e. “Route de L’Amitie 
Franco Hatienne (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001).  Also, by 1980, private investment 
in terms of hotel accommodations increased from under 1,000 in 1941 to 2,000 rooms in 1960 to 
3,000 rooms in 1980.  The rate of hotel development during that time, to accommodate the rate 
of tourism arrivals and receipts Haiti was experiencing, was rapid as Haiti went from having low 
number of hotels at the start of its tourism sector to a moderate level.  Examining the relationship 
between infrastructure from 1930-1980, the level of investment in infrastructure appears to be 
positively correlated with tourism arrivals and receipts which grew high during that period.    
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Since 1980, public investment in infrastructure (which, in the indices of this paper on 
infrastructure level, is combined with public-private partnerships (PPI) in infrastructure; this is 
because infrastructure projects (electricity, transportation, ports, water and sewage) are usually 
funded by a combination of public and public-private-partnership capital) has been rated low 
(see Table 3.1 in the Methodology section; and, Appendix E and F for Haiti’s Infrastructure 
Investment index and graphs).  During 1981-2000, infrastructure projects did not exceed $500 
million (Preeg, 1996; Library of Congress Country Report, 2001).  According to the PPI Index, 
private participation in infrastructure, which is important for governments to secure to finance 
the extensive capital required for infrastructure projects, totaled just $129 million (to illustrate 
the stark contrast in investment, a comparison with the Dominican Republic’s PPI investment 
will be discussed in the third case study of this paper).  Also, private investment receded when 
the number of hotel rooms decreased from 3000 in 1980 to 800 by 1999 due to a loss of tourism 
arrivals and receipts (to be explained further in the discussion on the interactive effects of 
country image perception).  Moreover, for the period 2001-2017, a high level of private capital 
was allocated to build or improve infrastructure in Haiti, especially after the 2010 earthquake.  
However, only a fraction of the amount allocated was disbursed; and, accordingly, few 
infrastructure projects pledged were executed (PEMFAR Accountability Report, 2008; U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GOA) Report, 2013)).  For example, from the United States, 
$1.14 billion was granted by Congress and USAID pledged $651 million to building Haiti’s 
infrastructure which had amassed nearly $13.2 billion in damages (IADB Country Report, 2013; 
GOA Report, 2013).  Despite this allocation, only $203 million was disbursed by the end of the 
accountability of funds period in 2013.  Further, a $260 million project proposed in 2013 to 
develop ecotourism in Ile-la-Vache was halted in 2015.  Haiti did have some success with its 
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telecommunications sector due to the Haitian government signing a public-private partnership 
with the Vietnam telecommunication company, Viettel, for nearly $100 million to upgrade 
infrastructure and services.  Post-earthquake, it was one of the highest delivered capital 
investment in infrastructure projects to be completed.   
 Pending infrastructure amounts pledged and outstanding amounts allocated, but not yet 
disbursed, represent opportunities for increasing tourism arrivals and receipts for Haiti.  During 
the 2000-2017, private investment in terms of hotel accommodations increased from 2,000 
rooms in 2010 to nearly 4,322 by 2015 (Export.gov, 2017).  After the earthquake, several hotels 
needed to be rebuilt and aid workers and missionaries involved in the reconstruction needed 
lodging.  Minister of Tourism Stephanie Villedrouin acknowledged the post-earthquake growth 
in a 2015 article with the Haitian publication, Le Nouvelliste, and indicated that direct 
investments to tourism were $345 million (a moderate level amount according to the scale of this 
paper) (Le Nouvelliste, 2015).  Further, she stated that Haiti saw a 40% increase in hotel rooms 
from 2011 to 2015 and claimed that the total number of hotel rooms was 9,280 (with 4,861 
“classified rooms of international standard of 1 to 5 hibiscus rating, in 177 hotels).  Despite the 
disparity in number of reported hotel rooms, private investment infrastructure from 2011-2018 
has been rated as high.  Tourism arrivals and receipts (the most recent numbers for all types of 
arrivals) for 2014 show Haiti had 1,127,577 visitors (662,403 cruise passengers and 465,174 
regular tourists) with a reported increase of nearly 11% in the number of regular tourists 
compared to the prior year.  In 2014, Haiti’s rate of increase for tourism arrivals was 13.9 
percent, over 5 times the regional average of 2.7% (see Appendices J for Haiti’s average growth 
rates for each period of its tourism development).   
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3.1.3 Nation Branding 
Haiti’s nation branding efforts from the inception of its tourism sector prior to the time 
where it experienced public safety challenges, during the 1940-1980 period, mostly relied upon 
public-private tourism promotion.  The government allocated public funds to promoting tourism.  
However, according to a 1973 Organization of American States (OAS) Audit Report, Haiti’s 
tourism promotion budget was poorly allocated (OAS Audit Report, 1973).  Nearly 60% of the 
total budget went to the salaries of the large staff that was employed at the National Tourist 
Office (OAS Audit Report, 1973).  Due to the misallocation, only a small amount remained for 
promotion, public relations efforts, publicity and literature (i.e. advertising brochures, flyers).  As 
a result, public spending on marketing promotions was low.  Reported public-private partnership 
in tourism promotion involving mostly private sector funding was at a moderate level in the form 
of airlines, hotel investors and travel agencies.  During the initial period of Haiti’s tourism sector 
development, it experienced a high growth rate of tourism.  While its arrivals and receipts 
(tourism arrivals and receipts, this paper’s dependent variable) were at moderate levels compared 
to its region by 1956 with 67,000 visitors, from the time tourism started in Haiti in 1945 with 
5,000 visitors to 10,788 in 1951, it grew tremendously in just over 10 years (Seraphin, 2011).  
Haiti received nearly 6 times the number of visitors in a five-year period 1951-1956.  
During the 1981-2010, public investment in marketing promotions continued to remain at 
low levels.  Haiti had experienced setbacks in its tourism sector development and tourism 
arrivals and receipts had stagnated.  There appeared to be several reasons for this unfortunate 
reversal.  In 1982, a rumor associated the origin of the AIDS disease to Haiti ((Library of 
Congress Country Report, 2001).  By then, political unrest had begun against President Jean 
Claude Duvalier’s dictatorship culminating in his ouster in 1986 and decades of political 
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instability and increasing crime levels (World Bank Country Report, 1987; Library of Congress 
Country Report, 2001).  In response, the Haitian government retreated their nation branding 
efforts instead of employing nation branding crises management promotional strategies.  Once 
tourism stagnated the country:  1) closed its tourism offices in 4 locations globally namely, New 
York, Miami, Paris, and Canada (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001; Fass, 1988); 2) 
removed its Ministry of Tourism department in 1986; and 3) reduced its allocated budget for 
tourism promotion by 1994.   
In terms of thousands of visitors, from 1987 to 2004, Haiti saw a reduction of 54% of 
arrivals (from 239,200 of all arrivals to 108,868) (Seraphin, 2011).  Haiti attempted to revitalize 
its tourism industry in the mid-1990s and early 2000s prior to the 2010 earthquake; but, nation 
branding strategic efforts such as promoting the city of Jacmel were continually hampered by the 
country’s public safety and infrastructure weaknesses (Seraphin 2011).  After the earthquake in 
2010, the country began attempting to revitalize tourism with more concrete results evident in its 
level of arrivals and receipts outside of its more successful cruise sector.  In 2011, the 
government appointed a Stephanie Villedrouin as Minister of Tourism, who quickly began 
strong efforts to rebrand Haiti in the wake of proposed and received aid to rebuild the country.  
The “Why Not Haiti” slogan was initiated and began appearing on the Ministry of Tourism 
website as well as promotional advertising literature.  Within 5 years, Haiti was included in 
World Economic Forum’s Competitiveness Index for the first time; but, it was ranked low for 
tourism marketing promotions.  Assessing the amount that the Haitian government spends on 
tourism promotion, based on the percent share of total tourism expenditure for 1995-2017, the 
WEF Report (2015) reported that Haiti’s levels ranged from 1.7% in 1995 to 3% from 1999 to 
2017).  Consistent with the scale of this paper on nation branding (public spending on tourism 
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promotion) levels, the percentages demonstrate a continued trend of low public investment in 
marketing promotions.  By contrast, public-private tourism marketing (another component of 
nation branding tourism promotional investment) has been high in terms of branded hotel 
promotions built after the 2010 earthquake and continued cruise ship promotions during the 
2011-2017 period. 
3.1.4 Interaction of IVs with Country Image Perception 
Examining tourism arrivals and receipts in Haiti from 1940-2016, as indicated in Table 
3.1, at times, there appears to be a correlated individual relationship between each of the 
independent variables and tourism arrivals and receipts except for the public safety variable level 
in Haiti’s most recent tourism period (2011-2016).  For public safety during 1940-1980, when 
crime was reported as low, tourism arrivals and receipts were high.  Furthermore, when crime 
was high during the time tourism was deprived (1981-2010), Haiti’s tourism sector had a -0.30% 
average tourism arrivals and receipts rate (see Appendix J.3).  Political stability, the other 
measurement of public safety created much variance with the dependent variable, throughout 
Haiti’s tourism periods.  Tourism arrivals and receipts were affected each time the country 
experienced political instability.  Likewise, the infrastructure investment levels, public and 
private, seemed to be correlated with tourism arrivals and receipts; however, there was no 
evidence that infrastructure investment made a direct change in tourism arrivals and receipts.  
This could be attributed to the periods where there was political instability (a public safety issue) 
and the overall tourism arrivals and receipts was adversely affected during those periods because 
of the reduction of arrivals and receipts.  Likewise, during that time, nation branding strategies to 
counteract the effect of the public safety situation was at moderate levels (with moderate 
investments invested by the private sector for tourism promotion and low investments coming 
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from the public sector).    Despite the modes of instability during the first half of Haiti’s tourism 
sector development, the overall perception of the country remained positive and tourism was 
growing at a high rate.  
During the 1981-2010 “Deprived Tourism” period, it is evident that there is a greater 
impact that public safety levels have on tourism arrivals and receipts with the additive effect of 
low infrastructure investments (from both the public and private sectors) and a retreat in the 
country’s nation branding (characterized by low tourism promotion investments by the public 
and private sectors) on the image of the country.  Travel destination information had reached 
potential international visitors during that time about Haiti’s political instability problems.  
Crime levels were not highlighted in the travel destination information I reviewed.  However, 
political instability reports, along with the AIDS rumor, appeared to be sufficient to create the 
perception that the country posed a threat to public safety (as tourism arrivals and receipts 
plummeted during that time).  While the public safety challenge appears to persist, according to 
reports from OSAC and country safety rankings, there seems to be some steady increases of 
tourism arrivals and receipts –especially since the 2010 earthquake.  Strong infrastructure 
investments from the private sector in terms of increased hotel rooms to accommodate the 
significant number of projects developing to rebuild the country is likely a contributing factor.  
However, nation branding promotions in terms of public-private tourism promotion can also 
have an impact as Haiti has recently been included in country rank indexes on global 
competitiveness.  Furthermore, the travel destination information sources, which make up the 
country image perception interactive variable in this study, had some positive information mixed 
with the mostly negative reviews of the country during the 2010-2017 period (as evidenced in 
Appendix I and Appendix U-the works cited for Appendix I).  The Igarape Institute reported on 
60 
Haiti’s recent tourism potential that “given the relatively low incidence of criminal victimization, 
the perception of Haiti at arrival to departure…overall tourists felt safer than expected during 
their stay”34.  In line with the theory of this paper, there were no positive travel destination 
information discovered for 1990-2009 when public safety, infrastructure investment and nation 
branding were at low levels that corresponded to the lowest growth period in Haiti’s tourism 
history. 
3.2 Dominican Republic Case Study (1940-2017) 
3.2.1 Public Safety  
As of 2001, crime rate statistics were not published by the Dominican Republic; 
however, daily newspapers in Santo Domingo did regularly report criminal incidents (Library of 
Congress Country Report, 2001).  During the country “Pre-Tourism” period (1930-1960), crime 
was estimated at moderate levels as the country had a strong and structured national police force 
that had been instituted in 1936.  Also, during this time, political stability was at moderate levels.  
The country was under the 31- year presidency of Rafael Le6nidas Trujillo Molina whose brutal 
dictatorship style of leadership produced stability until 1961 when he was assassinated.  During 
that time, tourism was virtually non-existent in the Dominican Republic with no more than 500 
reported visitors.  Following Trujillo’s assassination, the Dominican Republic experience 
political instability for the next five years and existing crime incidents grew to high levels.           
By 1980, the country was moderately stable politically.  However, despite a strong police 
force of 10,000, crime in the form of drug trafficking, homicides, rape and robbery as well as 
counterfeiting and extortion were still major concerns for the country and at high levels (Library 
of Congress Country Report, 2001).  After tourism began in 1967, the Dominican Republic 
                                                 
34 https://igarape.org.br/en/is-tourism-haitis-magic-bullet-an-empirical-treatment-of-haitis-tourism-potential/ 
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experienced unprecedent average rates of increase in tourism arrivals and receipts.  In 1971, four 
years after the country opens its Ministry of Tourism, the first international arrivals are recorded 
at 137,000 tourists (overnight stays and cruise passengers) (Fuller, 1999) with an average 
tourism arrivals and receipt rate of 16% for international arrivals and 32% for international 
receipts (see Appendices T, T.1-T.5).  The country’s average growth rate exceeded the 
Caribbean’s regional average tourism arrivals and receipts rate of 7% for arrivals and 10% for 
receipts.  After 1971, the country’s tourism sector soared beyond any other country in its region 
with arrivals reaching 747,000 in 1986, 1,181,000 in 1991, and 2,211,000 in 1997 (Fuller, 1999).   
In terms of international tourism receipts, in 1979, tourism receipts were US$124 million 
equivalent and rose to US$0.9 billion by 1989 (Dominican Republic: Defying the Odds. 
Draft Case study, World Bank 2011).  Through 1981-2000, crime remained at high levels while a 
moderate level of stability was maintained.  Likewise, in recent years 2001-2017 (according to 
the most recent numbers on crime-see Appendices K and L; and, for political stability-see 
Appendices M and N), stability as remained at moderate levels according to the World 
Governance Index (ranking in the 45.21 percentile in 1996 and 57.14 percentile in 2016).  
However, crime rates have increased to critical levels according to the homicide rates reported 
(other forms of crime have not been readily reported).   OSAC Reports declared that Dominican 
Republic’s crime rate was at a critical level in 2015 as homicide rates hard reached 30.9 per 
100,000 of inhabitants (OSAC, 2015-2017).  However, by 2017, other global reports indicated 
that crime was at a level of 14.9 per 100,000 inhabitants (World Health Organization Report 
EFE, 2017).  This figure is still classified as a high rate of crime according to this paper’s scale 
on crime rate levels.  Concerning the individual impact of public safety on tourism arrivals and 
receipts, it appears that the moderately stable level of the Dominican Republic political 
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environment may be sufficient to not adversely impact the level of tourism arrivals and receipts 
(as political stability has been identified in previous literature as important for tourism demand).   
3.2.2 Infrastructure Investment 
The Dominican Republic has been consistent in continually seeking to improve its 
infrastructure in order to develop more resorts, ecotourism and attract more cruise tourism.  From 
1967-2017, public spending (combined with the public-private sector partnerships in 
infrastructure) and private sector (number of hotel rooms) indicate a high level of investment in 
infrastructure (see Appendix O) that appears to be positively correlated with tourism arrivals and 
receipts.   The Dominican Republic received extensive assistance from the United States to 
develop infrastructure during its occupation of the country during the Trujillo dictatorship 
(Library of Congress Country Report, 2001).  The public (along with PPI) investment in 
infrastructure has maintained high levels, either for development or improvements of all types of 
infrastructure, ever since the 1940s.  From 1970-1980, the Dominican Republic uses public funds 
to invest in the country’s physical infrastructure.  The country develops INFRATUR (the 
Department of Investment and Infrastructure) and uses $76 million from the World Bank to 
develop a malecon and other tourist infrastructure in Puerto Plata (Fuller, 1999; Dominican 
Republic: Defying the Odds. Draft Case study, World Bank, 2011).  In addition, by 1974, the 
private sector investment had provided an infrastructure investment of 3,800 rooms (up from 
1,000 rooms in 1960 and 1,600 rooms in 1974) (Fuller, 1999; Library of Congress Country 
Report, 2001; and Dominican Republic: Defying the Odds. Draft Case study, World Bank, 
2011). 
By the end of 2000, the Dominican Republic had completed a large transportation 
infrastructure project funded by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to 
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improve maintenance systems (Country Report, 2001).  At the end of 2000, hotel rooms had 
reached 45,000.  Private sector investment in infrastructure had reached high levels where 8,562 
rooms existed in the country by the late 1980s and 21,500 by 1991 (Fuller, 1999).  Presently, the 
Dominican Republic has over 60,000 rooms, the highest in the Caribbean.  In addition, the PPI 
(Private Participation in Infrastructure) index on public-private partnerships in infrastructure 
reported a total investment of US$5,581 (in millions) from 1990-2017 for 33 projects covering 
the following sectors: airports, electricity, ports and roads (PPI Index, 1990-2017; also, see 
Appendix P).  Furthermore, as of 2016, statistics on international arrivals recorded numbers of 
5,959,300 overnight visitors for the Dominican Republic and international receipts of US$6,723 
(millions) (World Bank World Development Indicators).  Considering the high levels of 
investment in infrastructure and the high level of tourism arrivals and receipts, there appears to 
be a positively correlated relationship between infrastructure investment and tourism arrivals and 
receipts. 
3.2.3 Nation Branding 
Nation branding did not become a major priority for the Dominican Republic until after 
Trujillo was assassinated in 1961; and, after the 5-year period of instability (with persistent 
unrest until 1975) that directly followed his dictatorship ended (Library of Congress Country 
Report, 2001).  Since 1967, the government has been proactive to develop tourism through high 
investments levels of public and public-private tourism promotion partnerships by passing 
legislation related to tourism sector development and promotion.  First, the government 
appointed a Minister of Tourism in 1967 (But, the Department of Ministry of Tourism did not 
open until 1981; see Figure 3.4).  Then, the Dominican Republic passed the 1971 Tourist law to 
incentivize private tourism promotion (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001; Dominican 
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Republic: Defying the Odds Case Study, World Bank, 2011; Gonzalez et al, 2012).  In 1979, the 
government allocated US$2 million for the international promotion of the country’s “Come to 
the land that Columbus loved best” campaign (Fuller, 1999).  Further, during the 1970s, the 
government pursued private partnership investments to develop the first resort in Punta Cana.  
This initial private investment leads to numerous private sector partnerships with the government 
(Fuller, 1999; Library of Congress, 2001; Dominican Republic: Defying the Odds. Draft Case 
study, World Bank, 2011).  During the 1980s, a Spain-Dominican cooperative tourism 
development project allows for several Spanish branded hotels to develop in the Dominican 
Republic and promote tourism.  In 2000, INFRATUR, the Dominican Republic’s Central Bank 
for public finance of tourism promotion and infrastructure projects creates a special fund to 
promote tourism (Dominican Republic: Defying the Odds. Draft Case study, World Bank, 2011).   
In 1992, the Tourism Incentives Law was repealed and replaced by the tax law of the country; 
but, it was later reinstated to accompany the Tourism Promotion Fund that was set up to cover 
nation branding expenses (Gonzalez et al, 2012).   
The World Economic Forum’s Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Insight Reports 
(2007-2018) has consistently ranked the Dominican Republic’s public tourism promotion 
investment as high (over 20% of total tourism expenditure is devoted to tourism promotion).  
The World Bank’s World Trade and Tourism Council data set provides government spending on 
travel and tourism for the Dominican Republic’s for 1995 to 2018 (See Appendix R).  According 
to the high levels of nation branding, for the Dominican Republic, this independent variable is 




3.2.4 Interaction of IVs with Country Image Perception 
In analyzing the scaled ratings, for each of the variables in Table 4.1 for the Dominican 
Republic, most of the individual relationships between the independent variables of this paper -
specifically, infrastructure investment and nation branding, establish a positive correlation with 
the level of tourism arrivals and receipts.  This is consistent with the literature on tourism 
demand as well as the theoretical expectations in this study.  The higher the infrastructure 
investment and the higher the nation branding investment (public and private spending for both 
variable), the higher the level of tourism arrivals and receipts.  However, the public safety 
independent variable, comprised of crime rate levels and political stability rankings, produces 
an outlier relationship that is not consistent with the theory of this thesis.  In this study, the 
higher the public safety level, the higher the tourism arrivals and receipts.  However, the crime 
rate level for the Dominican Republic has been consistently high through the entire period of 
tourism development for the country (1967-2017).   
Alternatively, the other variable that comprises public safety, political stability, was 
unstable from 1961-1975; however, the country has enjoyed a moderate level of political 
stability since that time.  The reason for the deviation could be that crime rate does not have 
much of a bearing on tourism arrivals and receipts.  Another reason could be that the 
independent variable public safety provides enough of a security assurance for travelers if 
political stability is at least at moderate levels.  In that case, then the theory about political 
stability as a security measure, under the public safety variable, would be positively correlated 
with tourism arrivals and receipts. Finally, it is also probable that the combination of high 
levels of infrastructure investment and nation branding offset the lower levels of public safety 
risk created by the higher levels of crime.  The implication is that even with lower levels of 
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public safety, tourism arrivals and receipts can be high if infrastructure and nation branding 
investments are high.  As those two variables can create a positive country image that offsets 
any negative reports provided by the travel destination information sources on public safety.    
In examining the country image perception during the country’s tourism development, when 
the country image perception was negative, tourism arrivals and receipts were low.  Likewise, 
when the country image perception was positive, tourism arrivals and receipts were high.  This 
is consistent with the theory of this paper.  In one recent travel destination information source, 
Safe Around (2017), the Dominican Republic is ranked as 106/128 for safety (see Appendix S 
for the Dominican Republic’s Country Image Perception Scale).  However, the UL Safety 
Index (2017), ranks the country as average 59/100 for safety concerns.  Also, while one mass 
media report, the Daily Mail in the U.K., indicates that the country has a high murder rate, 
which was confirmed by the WHO EFE, 2017 report, nearly all travel reviews and guides (for 
2010-2017) have reported the Dominican Republic as safe for travel.  Moreover, a travel 
survey - the Canadian Omni Survey (2012) - polled 1,002 surveyors and 7/10 view the country 
as safe for travel.  
3.3 Haiti and Dominican Republic Comparative Case Study (1940-2017) 
3.3.1 Public Safety 
 In assessing the scaled ratings of each variable under public safety (Tables 3.1 and 4.1 in 
the Methodology section of this paper), the public safety levels for the Dominican Republic 
(Table 4.1) show that crime levels (from 1961-2016) have been high in the country - even while 
political stability has been at a moderate level.  Despite these findings, tourism arrivals and 
receipts (yearly arrivals and receipts) has been persistently high for the country its Early Tourism 
Period (1961-1980).  For Haiti, crime rates were reported low while political stability ranged 
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from unstable to moderate levels during the time it enjoyed its highest rates of tourism arrivals 
and receipts (1940-1980).  After political instability became prevalent and crime rate rose in 
1986, tourism arrivals and receipts stalled for Haiti.  While political instability does threaten 
safety and security at tourist destination, high levels of crime should create a more immediate 
concern for travelers who may be direct targets for criminals.  However, the findings of this 
paper do not support that assumption.       
 The Dominican Republic’s public safety levels is perceived higher than Haiti’s, even 
though crime has been high in both countries.  In examining the reasons for this puzzle, it is 
importance to look at the functional security benefits that the Dominican Republic provides 
potential travelers when it comes to ensuring their safety.  The Dominican Republic, as part of 
their tourism promotion strategies implemented specific safety measures to insulate travelers 
from the crime levels that persist in the country.  The country has a national police force of over 
10,000 members; however, they also instituted a “special police force” to provide security for 
tourist areas (Travel Trade Caribbean, 2014).  Since 2000, the Tourist Police (POLITUR)-made a 
department of the Ministry of Tourism by a presidential decree-has provided security to the 
tourism zones created by the Dominican government.  In 2014, the government passed the 
Organic Law of the Armed Forces (No. 139-13), which transformed the Tourist Police into 
Tourist Security Specialized Corps (CESTUR) (Travel Trade Caribbean, 2014).  The goal of the 
law is to upgrade the efficiency of the security plan being promoted by the Dominican 
government.  With law No. 139-13, CESTUR is transformed from a department of the Ministry 
of Tourism to a department of the Ministry of Defense (Travel Trade Caribbean, 2014).  As a 
member of the Defense Corps for National Security, CESTUR is defined in the new law as 
“specialized working units, made up by chosen members of the military institutions, with the aim 
68 
of providing security and protection in certain strategic areas vital for guaranteeing national 
interests.” (Travel Trade Caribbean, 2014).  The creation of CESTUR demonstrates a high level 
of planning, investment and coordination of the Dominican Republic’s key government 
institutions-their Ministry of Tourism and Department of Defense.  As part of their promotional 
campaign, the Ministry of Tourism has included information about the tourist police as a 
preemptive strike against any travel warnings coming from the outbound country threatening the 
image of the country.  The special tourist police have been noted by travelers who express 
feeling safe through travel reviews.  One traveler on the popular travel review site, Trip Advisor, 
noted “Very fun and safe to walk the streets, tourist police are everywhere” (TripAdvisor, 2016).  
3.3.2 Infrastructure Investment 
 As established in the tourism demand literature, quality infrastructure is important for 
tourism; and, as theorized in this paper, continued investments to improve all forms of 
inadequate infrastructure is necessary to increase tourism arrivals and receipts.  When tourism 
stagnated in Haiti, its public infrastructure spending and its private sector investments in 
infrastructure were simultaneously at low and moderate levels considering the country needed 
quality infrastructure.  Following Crouch (2011), it is up to countries to supply destination 
attractiveness in the form of quality infrastructure (i.e. adequate accommodation and 
transportation networks).  Destinations with a strong infrastructure forge the type of functional 
benefits that potential tourists demand.  To achieve destination attractiveness extensive 
investments in infrastructure must be made.  Infrastructure investments are made possible 
through government partnerships with the private sector (public-private participation in 
infrastructure).   
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 Despite the high amounts of capital pledged by various funding sources, the execution of 
infrastructure projects remain slow in Haiti relative to the high need for better infrastructure.  
Haiti’s water and sewage system have been operating below capacity for a long time.  Despite 
international aid pledged to improve the sanitation infrastructure all over the country, project 
plans have not progressed in the last five years passed the initial stages (Reddy, 2017).  In 
addition, the one treatment plant that was completed is underperforming because cost allocations 
were misdirected leading to a shortage to cover plant maintenance and payroll.   
 By contrast, the Dominican Republic’s investments in infrastructure have been 
consistently high-especially through its partnerships with the private sector.  Allocated capital 
has been disbursed to cover infrastructure projects; and, moreover, projects have been 
successfully completed.  The infrastructure investments could be attributed to a high private 
sector investor confidence in allocating and disbursing large capital to the country.  This 
indicates that compared to the Dominican Republic, Haiti has longstanding problems with 
governance.    A 2008 Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability Review 
(PEMFAR) Country Report on Haiti (World Bank, 2008), a collaboration between the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), the World Bank, and the Government of Haiti discusses the 
challenges Haiti faces managing public expenditures, public spending allocation and securing 
private sector investment on infrastructure.  As discussed previously in this paper, Haiti has not 
always completed projects from disbursed capital for infrastructure improvements.  The 
PEMFAR Report (2008) advised Haiti that effective management of aid flows was vital.  
Further, the country needed to improve its level of financial governance by continuing economic 
governance reform initiatives that began in 2004.  It appears that plans to increase accountability, 
transparency and efficiency in the use of public capital to “ensure that public investment 
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translates into accumulation of capital and growth” (PEMFAR Report, 2008), were not fully 
implemented.   The same report noted that relative to the need, government expenditure on 
infrastructure and security were low.    
3.3.3 Nation Branding 
The test countries in this case study comparison have two different country brands.    The 
Dominican government has worked hard to build a brand categorized by beautiful beaches, all-
inclusive resorts, incredibly warm water and fruity cocktails (Antillean Media Group Report, 
2016).   At the inception of its tourism industry in 1967, the Dominican Republic devoted 
extensive public capital to build its nation brand.  To actively promote the development of its 
tourism sector, the government passed the Tourist Law in 1971 to incentivize the private sector 
to partner with the government to promote tourism.  From that time to the present, both public 
and private partnership investments to promote tourism have remained at high levels.  According 
to figures from the World Bank, the Dominican government devotes 22% of the country’s total 
tourism expenditure (public investment) to tourism promotion (see Appendix R).  In return, the 
country’s brand is strong and tourism arrivals and receipts have been unprecedented compared to 
other travel destinations within its region.  The persistent high levels of nation branding in 
relation to high increases of tourism arrivals and receipts is consistent with the theoretical 
assumptions of this paper.       
By contrast to the Dominican Republic, Haiti’s brand once developed as “Tropical Idle” 
and the “Pearl of Antilles” deteriorated until recently when branding efforts were revitalized in 
2012 to encourage potential visitors to consider “Why not, Haiti?” as their next travel 
destination.  Also, unlike the Dominican Republic, Haiti has historically devoted a much lower 
percentage share of total tourism expenditure to tourism promotion.  From data available from 
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the World Bank, the country’s percentage share of total tourism expenditures that goes to 
tourism promotion has been at 3% since 1999.  According to the scale developed for nation 
branding in this paper, this is a low investment for public expenditures on tourism promotion.  
Regarding investments from the private sector, from 1945-1980, tourism promotion investment 
from public-private partnerships was at moderate levels.  However, during that time tourism 
arrivals and receipts were moderate.  After the country’s tourism sector deteriorated in 1986, 
public spending on tourism promotion fell to all time low percentages (from 1.7-2% according to 
World Bank figures available for 1995-1998; see Appendix H); and, public-private partnerships 
to promote tourism also stagnated at low investment levels (see Appendix G).  Recently, since 
the late 2000’s, while public spending has remained at a low rate of 3% (Appendix H), tourism 
promotion spending from public-private partnerships has been high (see Appendix G).  The 
higher levels of investments from the public-private partnerships have slowly begun to build a 
more favorable country brand for the country as Haiti was included in the World Economic 
Forum’s Travel and Tourism Competitiveness Report rankings for the first time in 2013 (World 
Travel and Trade Report, 2013).  The country ranked last out of 140 countries in 2013; however, 
its most recent ranking was 133rd out of 141 countries in 2015.  Considering Haiti has not yet 
built a sustainable brand, continued high levels of nation branding investments are necessary to 
counteract the negative country brand reputation it has developed over the years.       
 Nation branding is effective when governments promote the most attractive 
characteristics of its country to the right target market to achieve its goals for increasing tourism 
arrivals and receipts.  At the inception of their tourism industries, both the Dominican Republic 
and Haiti promoted their brand to the mass tourism market for overnight visitors and cruise ship 
passengers.  While Dominican Republic has been historically successful in mass tourism for 
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overnight visitors, trailing behind Haiti only in terms of cruise ship passengers, Haiti’s inability 
to counteract its negative country brand image changed the dynamics of its target market.  When 
Haiti’s tourism sector stagnated in 1986, after the AIDS rumor and Duvalier coup, it began to 
draw visitors only from its diaspora community.  As a result, its low investment in promoting 
tourism and the lack of priority in revitalizing tourism immediately after those crises pulled the 
country away from the mass tourism market.  The country’s success in cruise ships arrivals at 
Labadee (Haiti’s small peninsular province) only resulted from the decrease in safety risk that 
Labadee provided cruise passengers, as it was physically insulated from the areas in Haiti facing 
political unrest.  Unfortunately, the travel receipts from same day travelers produce lower 
tourism receipts than that of overnight stays.  Meanwhile, until 2011 when Haiti began 
revitalizing its tourism market for overnight stays, the country projected a brand image of 
poverty, having a weak infrastructure, and being constantly plagued by political instability to the 
extent that it relied on aid to survive.  The non-profit driven form of nation branding, attracted a 
new niche market of overnight tourists in the form of aid workers, missionaries, and business 
travelers.  Unfortunately, this type of tourism promotion is incompatible with the high levels of 
nation branding investment and positive marketing campaigns that are required to capture even a 
small share of the mass tourism market.  No longer the “Pearl of the Antilles”, from its mass 
tourism market days that ended in 1986 (Fuller, 1999; Seraphin, 2011), country promotional 
advertisements often projected Haiti as hopeless with the destination’s attractiveness only being 
used to generate more fundraising capital (Antillean Media Group Report, 2016).  As the country 
has done since 2011, Haiti must continue to disburse higher levels of nation branding 
investments to promote a positive image that is targeted to a smaller share mass market.       
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3.3.4 Interaction of IVs with Country Image Perception 
 The findings in Figure 3.1. on the scaled ratings for all variables for Haiti, indicated that 
for the public safety variable, while crime was low and stability was at moderate or unstable 
levels (during 1940-1985), tourism arrivals and receipts were moderate at best; and higher 
tourism arrivals and receipts were likely hampered by the random bouts of political instability or 
unrest (during 1956-1957, 1961-1962 and 1982-1985).  During those times, infrastructure 
investment from public and public-private partnerships and direct spending from the private 
sector (in terms of hotel accommodations such as the construction of Club Med and the Hyatt) 
ranged from moderate to high levels.  In addition, the country perception of the country was 
positive until 1982 when travel destination sources reported that AIDS originated in Haiti and 
political instability created a decline in tourism arrivals and receipts in 1984 (see Appendix I).  
However, from 1983 to 2000, public safety in Haiti was at low levels due to the combination of 
high crime and political instability.  During this time, infrastructure spending was low (as public 
and public-private partnerships diminished alongside the closing of many privately-owned 
hotels).   
Consistent with the low levels of public safety (indicating a security risk), low 
infrastructure investment and low public spending on nation branding (cruise ship tourism 
promotion was at moderate levels; but, this did not impact overnight travelers), tourism arrivals 
and receipts were low. The stagnation of Haiti’s tourism sector at that time is consistent with the 
theory of this paper as low levels in each variable were insufficient to counteract the negative 
country perception that had formed globally.  In the final period covered in this paper, 2001-
2016, public safety has remained low overall due to high (critical according to OSAC reports) 
levels of crime and political instability.  However, infrastructure investment (public & public-
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private partnerships along with direct private investment in terms of hotel accommodations) 
increased to high levels in late 2010 due to the earthquake that hit Haiti.  Moreover, nation 
branding efforts have been at high levels (not from public spending on tourism promotions; but, 
from private investors).   
Despite the public safety levels, indicating a high threat of security risk, higher levels of 
consistent increases in tourism arrivals and receipts were evident starting in 2013.  Recent media 
sources (travel blog and reviews) reported that any overnight visitors indicate that the reason for 
their stay in Haiti was for vacation purposes, not aid or missionary work, thereby indicating the 
country’s small penetration into the mass tourism market (Walton, 2016).  Also, during the 2001-
2016, while the overall country perception remains negative, some favorable reviews and reports 
have begun to describe Haiti as safe and appealing to visit as other travel destinations in the 
Caribbean.  The implication of this slight reversal in country perception is that the higher levels 
of infrastructure investment and nation branding are working to counteract the negative image of 
the country. 
Likewise, according to the findings in Figure 4.1. on the scaled ratings for all variables on 
the country, the Dominican Republic also demonstrated that there were countereffects of high 
levels of investments in infrastructure and nation branding on public safety levels in terms of 
generating increases in tourism arrivals and receipts.  Like crime in Haiti (since 1986), crime has 
been high in the Dominican Republic (since 1961) with only a moderate level of political 
stability as the differentiator between the two countries for the public safety independent 
variable.  The countereffects appear higher for the Dominican Republic as it has a long history of 
high investment in infrastructure and nation branding, thereby contributing to its positive country 
perception by the global community.  However, as discussed above, Haiti’s recent nation 
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branding investments have produced strong destination marketing promotions which are 
beginning to be discussed in travel destination sources. 
The main question of this study is what difference does the government institutions of 
Haiti and the government institutions of the Dominican Republic make for tourism growth, in 
terms of increases in arrivals and receipts?  I believe this study provides a clear answer, even 
with the findings that crime does not have as great an impact on tourism arrivals and receipts as 
expected when interacting with nation branding and infrastructure.  Each of the independent 
variables of this paper represents an area where government institutions in each country can 
effectively manage functional benefits (such as providing security for and promoting the 
existence of safety police to tourists as well as quality infrastructure) to generate increases in 
tourism arrivals and receipts.   
Public safety is managed by each country’s national police.  Whereas it was previously 
discussed that Haiti’s national police underreported crime, experienced policing challenges and 
needed the assistance of MINUSTAH to help raise the stability level in the country after 2004, 
the Dominican Republic (who also had a previous problem underreporting crime) has 
demonstrated better governance in this area.  As part of its tourism development, the country 
passed legislation to provide special tourist police as a branch of the country’s Ministry of 
Defense.   
The Dominican Republic has an effective Ministry of Tourism.  The special tourism 
forces were formerly a branch of the tourism department of the country; however, after the role 
of the tourist police was expanded, it was transferred to the department of defense.  However, 
both ministries work to assure tourists of the presence of security within the country.  
Information about the special police is included in the country’s tourism promotion literature.  
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As a result, any travel destination information a potential traveler might receive to indicate that 
the Dominican Republic is unsafe is counteracted by direct promotional information from the 
country’s Ministry of Tourism that their safety is assured.   
In assessing whether the country has been effective in building a country brand that 
projects a positive image, the evidence lies in the information that potential travelers receive 
from the Dominican Republic that they interpret as positive.  During my research on country 
image perception, I discovered several travel destination information sources advising potential 
travelers about the country’s special tourist police.  Many travel reviews, travel guides and mass 
media reports assured visitors that the tourist police were specifically placed in areas most 
frequented by travelers.  
In addition to its tourism ministry and security forces, the Dominican Republic has better 
governance in terms of its infrastructure investment.  While Haiti has had repeated challenges 
completing infrastructure projects and securing higher levels of disbursement from its public-
private partnerships, the Dominican Republic has a high level of partnership investment from the 
private sector.  The country has a strong central bank with a division (INFRATUR) that was 
created at the start of its tourism sector development to specifically to fund infrastructure 
projects.  INFRATUR receives private sector investments, as well as disburses public-private 
partnership and public funding to successfully complete the country’s infrastructure projects.  
Furthermore, the country has several all-inclusive resorts located in designated tourism zones.  
The designated tourism zones were tax incentives created by law to encourage private sector 
development and infrastructure improvement.  The designated tourism zones are protected by the 
special tourist police forces to insulate travelers from high crime areas throughout the country.   
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4 CONCLUSION 
For the test countries in this study, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, I examined how 
effective their government institutions were in providing functional benefits, such as public 
safety and infrastructure investment, as part of their country brand offering to satisfy the demand 
of their target market of potential travelers.  I theorized that higher levels of the independent 
variables, public safety (which was comprised of political stability and crime rates), 
infrastructure investment (comprised on public, public-private partnerships and private sector 
investment {hotel rooms}) and nation branding worked to create a positive brand image.  The 
favorable country brand is what countries promote to potential travelers to influence their travel 
decisions, as well as counteract any negative travel destination information they may receive 
from outside sources.  Countries that were successful would experience a rise in international 
tourism arrivals and receipts.  Considering the literature had already established an individual 
correlation between political stability, infrastructure investment and nation branding with 
tourism demand, I expected that my newly operationalized independent variables and dependent 
variable would indicate a better causal relationship to explain how countries generate increases 
in tourism arrivals and receipts.   
My findings were not entirely as expected.  Political stability, one of the variables used to 
measure the level of public safety in each test country, was the only variable which produced a 
strong causal relationship with the dependent variable, tourism arrivals and receipts.  For the 
Dominican Republic, its period of political instability preceded the formal inception of its 
tourism sector development in 1967.  As a result, tourism inflows were virtually nonexistent; 
and, the first recorded set of arrivals was 230 visitors in 1930 (see Appendix T.1).  However, 
around 1971, when the country began experiencing the moderate levels of political stability that 
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exists presently, the increases in tourism arrivals and receipts in the Dominican Republic have 
consistently remained at high levels.      
Generally, over the different tourism periods for both countries, I observed that whenever 
political instability was evident, tourism arrivals and, in most times, receipts declined 
significantly.  Furthermore, when both countries transitioned from a period of instability to 
moderate levels of political stability, the tourism arrivals and receipts increased to high levels.  
The exception to that finding was during Haiti’s most recent tourism period (2011-2016), during 
which the government took steps to revitalize tourism with extensive infrastructure and nation 
branding public and public-private sector investments.  During that time, crime (the other 
measure for public safety) was high; and, the country was classified as unstable (at a percentile 
rank ranging from 17.54/100 in 2011 to 22.38/100 in 2016—see Appendix B) according to the 
levels on political stability described under the World Governance Indicators on “Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism” that I used to determine the level of security risk 
in each country.  However, over the 2011-2016 period, Haiti experienced an average 13.9% 
increase in tourism arrivals (see Appendix J.4) was over 5 times the annual average (2.7%) 
increase for arrivals in the Caribbean region.  During 2011-2016 period, tourism receipts grew an 
average of 3% for Haiti, about less than 1% of the annual average for receipts in the Caribbean 
(see Appendix J.5).  The unexpected outcome indicated that there was likely an additive effect 
coming from the inclusion of the other independent two variables in my theoretical framework, 
which I will discuss further in this conclusion. 
For my intervening variable, country image perception, the outcomes were mostly as 
expected for both countries.   Country image perception for both Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic were directly impacted by information pertaining to the political stability level of the 
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country.  In nearly every instance, when each country was categorized as unstable, then the rate 
of arrivals and receipts declined.  When at least a moderate level of stability existed in both 
countries, they each experienced high levels of increase in arrival and receipts.  For the 
Dominican Republic, the outcomes were in line with previous findings from the literature on 
tourism demand and the theory of this paper.  When the country image perception was negative 
("comic opera prototype of Caribbean instability" (Fodor, 1960), then arrivals and receipts were 
at low levels.  However, since the perception of the country has been positive since 1970’s, 
increases in arrivals and receipts have been high.  In Haiti’s case study, the findings were not as 
distinct.  During the 1940-1980 and 1981-2010 periods, when country image perception was 
positive (Haiti was described by a 1976 New York Times article as “exotic and fascinating, 
possessed of a rich culture, a tempestuous past and a smiling, friendly populace”35), the country 
experienced high increases in arrivals and receipts (see Table 3.1).  Predictably, when perception 
of the country was negative (according to the 1994 Baltimore Sun article “Haiti has been so 
messed up for so long, it can't even do tourism anymore”36), tourism was negatively impacted as 
tourism arrivals and receipts declined by -30% for the entire period (see Table 3.1).  However, in 
Haiti’s most recent tourism period, the country image perception is still negative (a 2012 L.A. 
Times article was entitled “For troubled Haiti, tourism is a tough sell”37).  Despite this, the 
country experienced a high increase in arrivals (see Table 3.1 and Appendix J.5) and tourism 
receipts were just slight under the regional average.  As country image perception, from the 
demand side (i.e. potential travelers), is influenced by travel destination information sources, the 
results for Haiti indicated that it was possible that information was coming from the supply side 





(i.e. the potential travel destination) that could explain the difference in Haiti’s case.  The 
outcome revealed that there was an impact from the independent variables that seemed to bypass 
the normal effects of the intervening variable, country image perception, on the level of arrivals 
and receipts.        
For both countries, during my analysis, there were periods where a correlated relationship 
was predictably evident between individual independent variables and the dependent variable, 
tourism arrivals and receipts.  However, for the public safety independent variable, my findings 
indicated that crime rate levels did not appear to impact tourism arrivals and receipts as expected.  
As a security measure, no apparent causal relationship with tourism arrivals and receipts could 
be determined in the case study analyses for Haiti or the Dominican Republic.  It appeared that 
there were times that high levels of crime were correlated with low levels of tourism arrivals and 
receipts.  Alternatively, there were times when crime was at low levels in a period while 
increases in tourism arrivals and receipts were high.  However, after evaluating the tourism 
periods for both cases, crime proved not to be a causal factor.  Case studies for both countries 
showed that high percentages of arrivals and receipts were generated during periods when crime 
was high (see Tables 3.1. for Haiti and 4.1 for the Dominican Republic).   
To explore this puzzle further, I examined the individual impact of the remaining two 
variables in my theoretical equation and their impact on tourism arrivals and receipts in both 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic.  For Haiti, there were varied levels of public spending, 
public-private partnerships and private sector investments in infrastructure throughout each 
period of their tourism sector development.  Despite the different levels of investment, they did 
not create any apparent variations on the dependent variable in each period.  In one period (1981-
2010), there was a general correlation between infrastructure investment and tourism arrivals and 
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receipts.   During that period, low levels of public spending, public-private partnerships and 
private sector investments in infrastructure corresponded to low levels of tourism arrivals and 
receipts.  However, that relationship was not as clear in the previous period (1940-1980) where 
similar low levels in public and public-private partnerships still generated a high increase over 
time in arrivals between years where figures were available (24% in 1950, followed by 41% in 
1956 and 6% in 1960-see Appendix J.1).  Tourism receipts for 1960 indicated a 14% increase 
over time from 1950 figures (see Appendix J.2).  Furthermore, despite public and public-private 
private sector investment in infrastructure being at moderate levels during this period (1940-
1980), tourism arrivals declined in 1963 and dropped to -24% for tourism arrivals and -53% for 
tourism receipts from previously recorded figures (see Appendices J.1 and J.2).  This meant that 
changes in the level of another independent variable was likely creating that variance. 
For the Dominican Republic, infrastructure investments for public and public private 
partnerships and private sector investment have consistently been at high levels since the 
beginning of their tourism sector (see Table 4.1).  As tourism arrivals and receipts have been at 
high levels for the Dominican Republic during each of their tourism periods, infrastructure 
investment does appear to have a positive correlated relationship with the dependent variable.  
This is expected and in line with previous literature on tourism demand determinants as well as 
the theory of this paper.     
For the nation branding independent variable, the impact of public tourism promotion and 
public-private tourism promotion in terms of generating tourism arrivals and receipts varied 
between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.  For Haiti, between 1940 and 1980, public tourism 
promotion was low; however, public-private tourism promotion was at a moderate level.  Despite 
the low level of public tourism promotion, it appeared that a moderate level of public-private 
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tourism promotion was sufficient to produce high levels of tourism arrivals and receipts (see 
Table 3.1).   During the next period (1981-2010), when public and public-private tourism 
promotions were both at low levels, tourism arrivals were at low levels as expected.  In Haiti’s 
final tourism period, public tourism promotion was low while public-private tourism promotion 
was high; and, this resulted in a high level of tourism arrivals while tourism receipts were at low 
levels (see Table 3.1).  For the Dominican Republic, public and public-private tourism promotion 
were both low at the beginning of their early tourism period (1961-1980).  Tourism arrivals and 
receipts did not begin experiencing increase until after public and public-private tourism 
promotion reached high levels (after 1967 for public tourism promotion and 1971 for public-
private partnerships-see Table 4.1).  Therefore, some level of nation branding is strongly 
correlated with tourism arrivals and receipts.  However, a causal relationship between nation 
branding and tourism arrivals and receipts is not as evident as it is with political stability.   
The results of my intervening variable, country image perception, helped clarify the 
nature of the relationships between the independent variables of this paper.  In terms of 
interaction between the independent variables in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, I observed 
that when either country experienced political instability and a low level of public safety (where 
crime and instability simultaneously existed as in Haiti’s case), high levels of infrastructure 
investment and nation branding (only high levels of public-private tourism promotion for Haiti) 
appeared to offset the perception of the security threats.  This is where the previously discussed 
outcomes, for country image perception, indicated that certain variables were interacting to offset 
any negative information being provided to outbound potential travelers (which often deterred 
their decision to travel).  However, despite the potential threat that a high crime level and 
political instability in Haiti could pose, tourists still chose to visit Haiti during the 2011-2016.  
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However, it was unclear whether the overcompensation was based on a combination of high 
levels of infrastructure investment and nation branding; or, if high rates of one variable was 
creating the overcompensation.  It was not determined if the high level of nation branding (or a 
high level of one component of it), as the promotional component of my theory, was sufficient to 
offset the perception of security risk for travelers.    
For Haiti, the public spending measure of the nation branding independent variable, 
remained at low levels for Haiti across all time periods; however, moderate levels of the public-
private component of the nation branding seemed sufficient to help counteract the negative 
country image impact that political instability caused during 1940-1980 period.  After the 
political instability period passes, the country image perception intervening variable becomes 
positive.  This indicates that a moderate level of investment in public-private tourism promotion 
in Haiti can be sufficient to impact perception.  However, in comparing the interactions between 
the variables in both cases, the country image perception only changed from negative to positive 
when political stability was moderate and nation branding investment was at least moderate in 
one of its variables (public-private promotion in Haiti’s case).  The same type of additive effect 
between the three variables existed in the Dominican Republic, at its early stage of tourism 
development; however, the investment in both components of nation branding and infrastructure 
investment were high, while political stability remained at moderate levels.  The sustainability of 
this additive relationship indicates: 1) that with high levels of nation branding and infrastructure 
investment, and moderate political stability, governments can create a favorable country brand; 
2) the country brand is strong enough to project a positive country image that generates high 
levels of tourism arrivals and receipts - even when the crime rate is high.   
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While my hypothesis tests were not completely confirmed (as I predicted all three 
independent variables would be high to generate a high increase tourism arrivals and receipts), 
my theoretical framework concerning the necessary, additive relationship between my 
independent variables, and their ability to influence country image perception by providing 
functional benefits (reduction of security risk via at least moderate stability and infrastructure) to 
generate tourism arrivals and receipts is confirmed.  What this means is that government 
institutions can effectively manage the level of security risk by providing adequate infrastructure 
that insulates travelers from unsafe conditions created by crime and/or some level of political 
instability.  For example, the Dominican Republic has the all-inclusive resorts which provide 
amenities to travelers to the extent that they do not have to leave the resort to enter areas were 
crime may be prevalent.  In addition, the country provides and promotes their special tourism 
police.  The Dominican Republic has done this successfully due to its level of governance, as 
well as the effectiveness of their Ministry of Tourism, their Ministry of Defense and other 
institutions which collaboratively work together to provide those type of functional benefits.   
Future studies on tourism development or demand should expand the number of 
independent variables to determine the level of governance for their test countries.  Moreover, 
political stability should be treated independent of crime rates or solely as a determinant of 
security risk.  In this study, because I was measuring for public safety, I only used the World 
Governance Indicators (WGI) for political stability/absence of violence.  However, the key 
difference between Haiti and the Dominican Republic is their political stability levels in terms of 
effective governance and institutional strength, not occurrences of violence.  The success in 
governance for the Dominican Republic is because it had fewer regime changes than Haiti, who 
had 18 governments in a less than 30 years.  The frequent change of governments makes it 
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difficult to produce policies that require continuity, persistent investment, extensive planning, 
and financial accountability as tourism development does.  In recent years, studies show that 
Haiti’s level of governance has increased, even if the global community still classifies the 
country as “unstable” from the political instability/absence of violence perspective.  Expanding 
the literature in the future would be helpful in seeing the variance levels of stability in Haiti and 
countries like it.  The theoretical framework I provide in this study allows for future scholarship 
to build upon my arguments to provide further explanations for how governments can effectively 
manage their country brand, tourism development and global perception to generate increases in 
tourism arrivals and receipts.  
The findings of this study also produced a unique problem concerning the measurement 
of crime rates for public safety, a main independent variable of this paper, and its impact on 
tourism arrivals and receipts.  This quandary serves as an opportunity for further studies to 
provide more concrete explanations for the variance concerning what creates the perception of a 
threat to safety in this paper’s findings.  While political stability is used as a common measure 
for security risks, I expected that including the crime rate as a variable for public safety would be 
an even more important indication of the level of security risk in each country.   
In conclusion, this study highlighted the issue of underreported crime and the lack of 
national crime statistics system in many countries.  The scarcity of reliability of crime data 
information explains why literature on tourism demand determinants tends to exclude it as a 
measurement for security.  Political instability is widely reported by most country’s media 
sources.  Therefore, travel warnings or information about the volatile environment within a 
foreign destination is more accessible.  To advance the literature in this area, there are several 
variables that can be used to determine why crime is underreported and how it impacts travel 
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safety when tourists are given misinformation about crime abroad.  For destinations where crime 
is being or has been underreporting, it will be important to look at corruption levels, governance, 
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Appendix A - Public Safety/Crime Rate Level (Haiti) 
Time 
Period38 Major Crime Incidents 
Reported Crime  
Rate Level 
1940-1960 
 Haiti’s military (Forces Armees d'Haiti—FAd'H) 
inadequately polices the country as Haiti has no national 
police force Low 
1961-1980 
 Haitian government continually reports Haiti is “free of 
crime”39 Low 
1981-2000 
 1986-crime levels are continually reported as “rising” 
(through the 2000s) and undermines the Fad’H 
credibility 
 1990s—Haiti tries to build its national police force to 
combat severe security and crime problems (police force 
starts in 1989) 





o Kidnappings (until 2013), homicides, car jackings 
and robberies are a major crime concern 
o Haiti’s overall crime rate is classified as “high” but 
considered lower than other countries in its region 
mainly due to a lack of mass tourism and continued 
“underreporting” (especially of homicide rates 
2007-2011) 
o 2010—Nearly 5,000 prisoners escaped from the 
national penitentiary during the earthquake and only 
25% are recaptured 
 2014—2017: Kidnappings are diminishing (especially 
incidents against American victims) 
 See homicide (and other crime rate, as available, for 
Haiti in Appendix B) 
High  




                                                 





39 Report that Haiti is crime free: Country Report, 2001 and NY Times article (1976) 
https://www.nytimes.com/1976/11/21/archives/whats-doing-in-haiti.html 
40 Based on OSAC (2006-2018) Reports 
41 Based on OSAC (2006-2018) reports that classify crime rate levels as “critical” mainly based on the homicide rates and other 
violent crimes such as kidnappings, rapes, assaults, shootings and carjackings 
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Appendix B - Public Safety/Crime Rate Graphs (Haiti) 
 
Appendix B.1 Other types of crime prevalent in Haiti 































Homicide Estimates in Haiti 
2003 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Kidnappings 93 540 293 309 73 121 159 36 63
Rape 149 284 271 310 487
Assaults 243 724 1528 1853 2,985









CRIME RATES IN HAITI (2003-2013)
Kidnappings Rape Assaults Robberies and Thefts
Number of Incidents Crime Rate Level 
0-500 Low rate of crime 
501-1000 Moderate rate of crime 
1001-2000 High rate of crime 
2001-above Very high rate of crime 
95 
Appendix C - Public Safety/Political Stability Index (Haiti) 
Time 




 1956 - Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier seizes power in military 
coup and is elected president (his violent regime lasts from 1956-
1971).  
 1958 - Creation of violent paramilitary force Volontaires de la 
Sécurité Nationale (VSN) known as the Tontons Macoutes 
following coup attempt against François Duvalier 











 1961- Jacques Stephen Alexis’ failed Communist coup against 
Duvalier; Alexis is tortured than murdered 
 1976 - Widespread protests against the repression of the nation's 






Between 1986 and 2014, Haiti had 18 regime changes/changes of 
government 
 1982 – 1985  
o Political unrest begins against Duvalier’s dictatorship; food 
riots against poverty turn towards the government; students 
killed in Gonaives spark angry major demonstrations against 
the government (plus AIDS rumor starts in 1982) 
 1986 – Jean Claude “Baby Doc” who succeeded his father, “Papa 
Doc” in 1971 flees Haiti in the wake of the discontent started in 
1982; and is replaced by Lieutenant-General Henri Namphy  
 1988 - Leslie Manigat becomes president, but is ousted in a coup 
led by Brigadier-General Prosper Avril, who installs a civilian 
government under military control.    
 1991 - Populist priest Jean Bertrand Aristide, elected president by 
large majority, is unwilling to govern within political system and 
alienates elite and foreign community. He is overthrown and 
replaced by military-supported puppet government.  
 1999-2000 - Following two years of stalemate between the 
executive and the opposition-led legislature, President Preval 
dissolves the legislature and rules by decree. Preval uses 
unchecked executive power to ensure victories for his party, 






WGI Political stability estimates– see Appendix D for WGI political 
stability estimates 
WGI percentage rank estimates during this time range from 0-100% 
on the political stability/absence of violence scale. The closer to 
100%, the more stable the country.  Stability is rated as unstable due 
to the low score range Haiti has achieved.  Unstable
                                                 





43 Represents the level of stability during the period, except as noted 
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Appendix D - Public Safety: Political Stability Percentile Rank (Haiti) 
 

































Haiti Political Stability/Absence of Violence










No major incidents; but, there may be some 
random political unrest or temporary instability 
incidents 
90-100%  Stable 
No threat of major incidents, political unrest, 
violence and political instability is unlikely 
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Appendix E - Infrastructure Investment/Public and Private Sector (Haiti) 
Time 
Period44 
Infrastructure Investments (PPI=public private 





1930-1960  1915-1934: U.S. occupation brings the building of 
infrastructure (roads, bridges, canals, public buildings, 
telecommunication, water and sewage) 
 1956: Haiti receives a $2.6 million loan from World 
Bank to improve its transportation infrastructure (725 
miles of primary and secondary roads) 
Combination: 










 Number of Hotel Rooms: under 2,000  Private Moderate 
1961-1980  1970-1980s ($300 million-adjusted for inflation):  
o Paved road project constructed among Haiti’s major 
cities & secondary road is built in rural areas (Route 
de l’Amitie Franco-Haitienne) 
o Improvements in electricity, telecommunication, 
airfreight facilities in Port au Prince; construction of 
two industrial parks  
o Secondary road project funded by USAID, World 



















 Number of Hotel Rooms: approx. 3,000 including Club 





1981-2000  Secondary road project funded by USAID, World 





 Number of Hotel Rooms: 
o 3,000 (by 1981) 
o 800 (by 1999) - Club Med closed in 1986, reopened 









2001-2017  2001-2007: $129,720,000 allocated (infrastructure 
improvement); but, only $37,890,000 executed  
 Post 2010 earthquake:  
o $1.4 billion granted by U.S. Congress for 
reconstruction USAID pledges $651 million ($203 
million disbursed by 2013)  
o Vietnam telecommunication company, Viettel, 
grants nearly $100 million to upgrade infrastructure 
 2013-2015: $260 million Ile-la- Vache project 
proposed, then halted - land ownership dispute 
 2017: Infrastructure investment proposed by China $30 

























 Number of Hotel Rooms:  
o 2,000 (2010); but over 4,322 (by 2015);  
o Minister of Tourism claims 9,280 hotel rooms 
[including 4,861 of classified rooms of international 











                                                 
44 1930-1941 Country Report, 2001; 1930-2017 on Public & PPP infrastructure investments (Preeg-Haitian Dilemma, 1996) and 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/china-extends-her-silk-road-to-haiti_us_5984927ae4b0bd8232029723 
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Category Scale of PPI Investment 
 
Infrastructure PPI (in Millions) Investment Level in infrastructure 
$0-500 Low level of investment 
$501-1000 Moderate level of investment 
























Total Investment by Sector
Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) 
Haiti Public-Private Partnerships 
1990-2014
Electricity
ICT (Info and Communications)
Ports
Water and Sewage
Public-Private Partnerships/Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) in Haiti 




(in Millions) Investment Level
Electricity 3 $67 Low 
ICT (Information and Communications) 2 $1 Low 
Ports 1 $57 Low 
Water and Sewage 1 $1 Low 
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Appendix G – Nation Branding/Public and Private Tourism Promotion (Haiti) 
Time 
Period45 
Nation Branding/Public & Private Tourism 
Promotion 
 
Investment Type  
Investment 
Level 
1940-1980  A 1973 Organization of American States 
(OAS) Audit Report indicates that Haiti’s 
tourism promotion budget has been poorly 
allocated—60% of the total budget goes to 
the salaries of a large staff in the National 
Tourist Office-only a small amount for 


















 Private marketing funding from Pan Am, 





1981-201146  1982: Haiti is associated with AIDS 
 1980s:  Tourism offices closed in 5 cities 
globally and promotion diminished 
 By 1986, there was no Ministry of Tourism 
 1990s: Allocated budget for tourism 














 Cooperative-American Airlines proposes 
$25K marketing promotion partnership 
(public-private) 
 Royal Caribbean invests $5 million to 
develop & market cruise tourism in Labadee 
(public-private)- but briefly suspends cruises 
after Aristide is overthrown in 1991 




















they are in 
Haiti)
2011-2017  Haiti appoints a new Minister of Tourism 
 Extensive branding begins in Haiti 
 “Why Not Haiti” slogan -beyond just cruise 
tourism promotions 
 Haiti begins to be included in the Global 
Competitiveness index (2015); but, is ranked 















 IADB/MIF Funding for tourism projects 
 Center for Facilitation of Investments (CFI) 
in Haiti facilitates public-private tourism 
promotion in Jacmel, Ile La Vache and Cote 
de Fer (est. $289 million USD)  
 FDI-3 new luxury branded hotels built (Best 
Western, Royal Oasis and Marriott) and 




















                                                 
45 1940-1999 Country Report, 2001 
46 Development Associates, Inc. Tourism Specialist Report (1986); World Bank Country Report (1987); IADB Haiti Report-
Developing North Department, 2016, WEF Travel and Tourism Report, 2012-2018 
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Government spending on T&T in Haiti
(% share of total tourism expenditure)
% share of total 
tourism expenditure 
 
Nation branding/public investment on tourism promotion level 
0-9%  Low investment in tourism promotion 
10-19% Moderate investment in tourism promotion 
20% - above High investment in tourism promotion 
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Appendix I – Haiti’s Country Image Perception Scale 
Haiti Country Image Perception 1940-201847 
Time 
Period 
Travel Destination Information 
Source 





1949 Missing data  
Later sources reveal a perception that covers this 
period Positive
1950-
1959 Missing data  





 Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean 
(1960)  
 New York Times article (1977) 
 Favorable – Haiti is viewed as “fascinating” 








Mass Media reports 
 Sports Illustrated article (1973)  
 New York Times article (1974)  
 New York Times article (1976)  
 People Magazine article (1977)  
 
Travel guide 
 Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean 
(1974) 
Mass Media reports 
 Favorable on tourism surge in Haiti 
 Favorable on Haitian art (including souvenirs) 
 Favorable – Haiti is fascinating and safe 
 Favorable – Baby Doc to undo father’s 
damage 
Travel guide 










Mass Media reports 
 New York Times article (1982)  
 Washington Post article (1984)  
 New York Times article (1984) 
 New York Times article (1986) 
 Unfavorable--AIDS link to Haiti- tourism 
decline 
 Unfavorable--AIDS, instability causes decline 
 Favorable—Haiti still has allure for business 
FDI 




Mass Media reports 
 Baltimore Sun article (1994)  
 New York Times article (1995) 
 Unfavorable - Club Med Haiti’s loss of 
tourists 
 Favorable – Haiti tries to revive tourism Negative
2000-
2009 
Mass Media reports 
 BBC News (2004) 
 Christian Science Monitor 
(2008) 
 The Independent-UK (2008)  
 Reuters online article (2009)  
 The Tyee (2009) 
 
 Unfavorable – Haiti: an economic basket case 
 Mixed – Haiti is safe; negative image hurts 
tourism  
 Mixed review -Haiti a mix of fun & poverty 
 Favorable – Cruise ship boost tourism in Haiti 
 Unfavorable – Haiti’s brand is cursed Negative
2010-
2017 
Mass Media reports 
 World Nomad blog (2011) 
 BBC article (2013) 
 Haiti Hub website 
 Lonely Planet (2015) 
 USA Today (2018) 
ld d bl ( )
Mass Media reports 
 Unfavorable—Haiti has safety issues 
 Unfavorable—safety warnings about Haiti 
 Favorable—Haiti is as safe as others 
 Favorable—on the best places to visit in Haiti 
 Unfavorable—Advises Haiti is dangerous  
f bl i h id i
Negative
Travel guide (2016) 
 Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean  
 Unfavorable – Haiti: no longer included in 
Guide
Travel reviews:  
TripAdvisor  
 Favorable—travelers claim Haiti is as safe as 
others
Country Safety Rankings 
 SafeAround (2017) 
 UL Safety Index (2017)  
 Unfavorable – Haiti is ranked 118/128  
 Unfavorable—Haiti: below average 40/100 
                                                 
47 The country image perception references are listed in a separate page in the Works Cited section of this thesis 
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Appendix J – Tourism Arrivals and Receipts Graph (Haiti)  
Appendix J.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals (Haiti, 1940-1980): 
Golden Tourism Period (1940-1980) 
 
Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1940-1980) 
 
Average rate of international arrivals Growth rate level 
0-6.99% Low average growth rate for international arrivals 
7-9.99% Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals 
10% - above High average growth rate for international arrivals 
  



























Total average tourism growth rate for period=13%
Haiti's Golden Tourism Period (1940-1980)
Number of International Arrivals Tourism Growth Rate
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Appendix J.2 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Tourism receipts (Haiti, 1940-1980): 
Golden Tourism Period (1940-1980) 
 
 
Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 1940-1990) 
 
Average rate of International receipts  Growth rate level 
0-9.99% Low average growth rate of international receipts 
10-12.99% Moderate average growth rate of international receipts 
13%- above High average growth rate of international receipts 
  











1950 1960 1963 1972 1979 1980
Total average tourism growth rate for period=14%
Haiti's Golden Tourism Period (1940-1980)
International tourism, receipts (current US$) Tourism Growth Rate
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Appendix J.3 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals (Haiti, 1981-2010): 
Deprived Tourism Period (1981-2010)48 
 
Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1980-1995) 
 
Average rate of international arrivals Growth level 
0-4.99% Low average growth rate for international arrivals 
5-7.99% Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals 
8% - above High average growth rate for international arrivals 
Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1995-2016) 
 
Average rate of international arrivals Growth level 
0-2.69% Low average growth rate for international arrivals 
2.7-4.99% Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals 
5% - above High average growth rate for international arrivals 
                                                 
48 Two category scales cover this period due to the annual growth rate changes in the Caribbean region 




-0.02 0.01 -0.01-0.03-0.29 0.17












1981 1982 1983 1984 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total average tourist growth rate for period= -0.30%
Haiti's Deprived Tourism Period (1981-2010)
Number of International Arrivals Tourism Growth Rate
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Appendix J.4 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Receipts (Haiti, 1981-2010): 
Deprived Tourism Period (1981-2010)49 
 
Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 1940-1990) 
 
Average rate of International receipts  Growth rate level 
0-9.99% Low average growth rate of international receipts 
10-12.99% Moderate average growth rate of international receipts 
13%- above High average growth rate of international receipts 
 
Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 1990-2000) 
 
Average rate of International receipts  Growth rate level 
0-12.99% Low average growth rate of international receipts 
13-17.99% Moderate average growth rate of international receipts 
18%- above High average growth rate of international receipts 
  
                                                 
49 Two category scales cover this period due to the annual growth rate changes in the Caribbean region 













Total average tourism growth for period = 8%
Haiti's Deprived Tourism Period (1981-2000)
International tourism, receipts (current US$) Tourism Growth Rate
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Appendix J.5 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals and Receipts (Haiti, 2011-2016): 
Rejuvenated Tourism Period (2011-2016) 
 
Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 2011-2016) 
 
Average rate of international arrivals Growth rate level 
0-2.69% Low average growth rate for international arrivals 
2.7-4.99% Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals 
5% - above High average growth rate for international arrivals 
 
 
Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 2000-2016) 
 
Average rate of International receipts  Growth rate level 
0-3.89% Low average growth rate of international receipts 
3.9-5.99% Moderate average growth rate of international receipts 









2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Average tourism growth rate for period =13.9%
Haiti's Rejuvenated Tourism Period
Number of International Arrivals Tourism Growth Rate
$456,000,000 $447,000,000
$546,000,000 $578,000,000 $609,000,000 $511,000,000







2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Total average tourism growth for period=3%
Haiti's Rejuvenated Period (2011-2016)
International tourism, receipts (current US$) Tourism Growth Rate
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Appendix K - Public Safety/Crime Rate Level (D.R.) 
Time 





 Dictator Trujillo (1931-1961) uses the country’s national police force 
for personal means and not a national institution Moderate
1961-1980 
o Drug trafficking, murder, rape, and robbery to fraud, counterfeiting, 
and extortion are major concerns High 
1981-2000 
 1980-1990: 
o Drug trafficking, murder, rape, and robbery to fraud, 
counterfeiting, and extortion are still major concerns 
o Government did not publish statistics on national occurrences of 
crime but Santo Domingo papers regularly report crime 
o Police works to crack down on crime High
2001-2017 
 Crime common to tourists, i.e. "crimes of opportunity”51 are 
prevalent: street robbery, pocket picking, credit card fraud, ATM 
fraud, burglary and theft from vehicles; and, if the victim resists, 
injury often results 
 Police response is poor 
 2013-2015: homicides decreased 
 2017: Global report lists Dominican Republic as one of the 9 highest 
countries for crime (30.9 per 100,000 inhabitants)52 while 2017 
reported crime as 14.9 per 100,000 inhabitants (see Appendix L) for 
crime rate levels according to homicide incidents per year 















163239-190 and OSAC Reports (2007-2018) 
51 OSAC Report (2007) 
52 https://dominicantoday.com/dr/local/2017/05/17/dominican-republic-among-worlds-10-homicide-leaders/ and 
https://www.oyster.com/articles/51359-9-popular-tourist-destinations-with-surprisingly-high-murder-rates/ 
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Appendix L Public Safety/Crime Rate Graph (D.R.) 
 
 








































Homicides in the Dominican Republic 
Number of Incidents Crime Level 
0-500 Low rate of crime 
501-1000 Moderate rate of crime 
1001-2000 High rate of crime 
2001-above Very high rate of crime 
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Appendix M – Public Safety/Political Stability Index (D.R.) 
 
Time 
Period53 Incidents threatening political stability Stability Level 
1930-1960 
 Political instability existed prior to Rafael Leonidas Trujillo 
Molina’s dictatorship and violence during the oppressive 
regime (nearly 20,000 Haitians living in the Dominican 
Republic are killed) Moderately Stable
1961-1980 
 1961: The assassination of de facto ruler Trujillo ends the 
regime                         
 1963-1966: Military overthrows newly elected democratic 
government, establishes junta, and restricts leftwing parties  
 1965: Brief civil war between short-term president Juan 
Bosch Gavifio's liberal constitutionalist party and the 
conservative loyalist military factions.  Insurrection by 
supporters of the deposed president results in external 
intervention in support of Wessin regime  
 1970-1975: The Dominican military periodically conducted 
operations to suppress insurgencies (insurgent groups were 





1981-1995  No major incidents reported Moderately Stable
1996-2016 
54 
WGI Political stability estimates– see Figure 1 for WGI 
political stability estimates 
 WGI estimates during this time range from -0.07 in 
1996 to 0.29 in 2016 based on a -2.5 to 2.5 political 
stability scale.  Stability is rated as low due to the low 
score range the D.R. has achieved.  This indicates that 
the country has improved over time but that it maintains 





                                                 





54 WGI  
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Political Stability/Absence of Violence
Percentile Rank (0-100%) Political Stability Level Political Stability Level Definition 
0-49% 
Unstable Active Incidents of violence, political unrest and 
political instability 
50-89% 
Moderately Stable No major incidents; but, there may be some 
random political unrest or temporary instability 
incidents 
90-100% Stable No threat of major incidents, political unrest, violence and political instability is unlikely 
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 Investments made in constructing roads, sanitation 
systems, ports and schools.  Dictator Trujillo is 
active in improving the country’s infrastructure with 
help from the United States during its occupation of 











 Number of Hotel Rooms: under 1,000 Private Low 
1942-
1960 
 1950s: D.R.’s government invests public funds to 





 Number of Hotel Rooms: 1,000 Private Low 
1961-
1980 
 1970-1980s: D.R. government funded public works 
extensively invests in the country’s physical 
infrastructure 
 1970s:  D.R.’s newly formed INFRATUR (Department 
of Investment and Infrastructure) was given $76 
million (USD) in World Bank funds to develop a 


















 Number of Hotel Rooms: 3,800 (by 1974) Private Moderate 
1981-
2000 
 1980-1990s: Narrow roadways, which flood easily, 
are improved in a large transportation infrastructure 
project funded by funds from the World Bank and 
the Inter-American Development Bank to develop 
better maintenance systems 
 1990s: D.R. public works embarks on a major road 















 Number of Hotel Rooms:  
o 8,562 rooms (by late 1980s) 
o 21,500 (by 1991) 











 2000s: The IMF approves the D.R.’s request for 
special funding of $56 million (USD) to rebuild 
infrastructure damage from Hurricane Georges 
(which struck in 1999) 
 See separate chart for exclusive public-private 













 Number of Hotel Rooms: 66,790 (by 2011) Private High 
                                                 
55 1930-1999 Country Report, 2001: http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Dominican Republic and Haiti Study_1.pdf 
and Country Studies on Dominican Republic, 1999: http://countrystudies.us/dominican-republic/37.htm: 
http://countrystudies.us/dominican-republic/37.htm;  Barrera et al, 2007; and Meyer-Ardent et al, 1992; 2000-2017: PPP Index; 1990-
2017: https://pppknowledgelab.org/countries/dominican-republic and https://www.isc.hbs.edu/resources/courses/moc-course-at-
harvard/Documents/pdf/student-projects/DominicanRepublic_TourismCluster_2007.pdf 
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Public-Private Partnerships: Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI)  





Total Investment (in Millions) Investment 
Level 
Airports 3 $350 Medium 
Electricity 22 $3,660 High 
Ports 4 $542 Medium 
Roads 4 $1,029  High 
 
Category Scale of PPI Investment 
 
Infrastructure PPI (in Millions) Investment Level in infrastructure 
$0-500 Low level of investment 
$501-1000 Moderate level of investment 
$1,001-up High level of investment 



























Total Investment by Sector
Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) 







Appendix Q -Nation Branding/Public and Private Tourism Promotion (D.R.) 
Time 
Period 
Nation Branding/Public & Private Tourism 
Promotion 
 




1940-198056  Prior to 1967: Tourism was non-existent 
 1967-71: Government appoints a Ministry of 
Tourism and tourism promotion begins after 
passing of the 1971 Tourist Law to 
incentivize private tourism promotion 
 1979: Government allocates $2 million for 
the international promotion of the country’s 

















Low (prior to 
1970) 
High 
 1970s-Initial private investment for the first 
resort in Punta Cana leads to numerous 










1981-201057  Tourism promotion fund established between 
the government and the National Hotel & 
Restaurants Association  
 INFRATUR, the D.R.’s Central Bank public 
financing department funds the promotion 
and completion of several tourism projects 


















 1980s: Spain-Dominican cooperative tourism 
development project builds and promotes 







2011-201758  The World Economic Forum’s Travel and 
Tourism Competitiveness Insight Reports 
consistently ranks the Dominican Republic’s 
public tourism promotion investment as high 











 Ecotourism projects -development and 
promotion being funded by public-private 










                                                 
56 1940-1980 sources: Country Report, 2001, Fuller, 1999; 1981-2011 sources: Fuller, 1999; UN Treaty, 1982;  
57 1981-2011: IWRAW http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/iwraw/publications/countries/dominican_republic.htm; DR: Defying the Odds 
Report, 2011; Tourism Cluster Report, 2012; Fawcett (2015); Caribbean Resource and Development Centre Report, 1988 
58 2011-2017: WEF Travel and Tourism Report, 2012-2018; Ministry of Tourism Report (2010) 
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Appendix R - Nation Branding/Public Tourism Promotion Investment (D.R.) 
 







21.1 21.4 21.6 21.7
20.3 20.5 20.9 21.0
21.1 21.2 21.3 21.5 21.6 21.7 21.8 21.9



























Government spending on T&T in the Dominican 
Republic
(% share of total tourism expenditure)
% share of total 
tourism expenditure 
 
Nation branding/public investment on tourism promotion level 
0-9%  Low investment in tourism promotion 
10-19% Moderate investment in tourism promotion 
20% - above High investment in tourism promotion 
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Appendix S - Dominican Republic’s Country Image Perception Scale 
Dominican Republic (D.R.) Country Image Perception 1940-201859 
Time 
Period 
Travel Destination Information 
Source 





1949 Missing data  
Later sources reveal a perception that covers this 
period Negative
1950-
1959 Missing data  





 Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean (1960) 
 Unfavorable -D.R. viewed as unstable for travel 
(review of the country is only 6 pages) Negative
1970-
1979 
Mass Media reports 
 New York Times article (1971)  
 New York Times article (1977)  
 New York Times article (1977)  
 New York Times article (1977)  
 New York Times article (1979)  
 New York Times article (1979)  
 New York Times article (1979) 
Travel guide 
 Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean (1974)
Mass Media reports 
 Favorable about growing tourism sector 
 Favorable about D.R. wooing tourists 
 Favorable on happenings in the D.R. 
 Favorable on D.R. investing in tourism 
 Favorable of D.R.’s civil and political rights 
 Favorable on D.R. being best kept secret 
 Favorable on D.R.’s plan to develop tourism 
Travel guide 
 Favorable about revitalized tourism sector Positive
1980-
1989 
Mass Media reports 
 New York Times article (1982)  
 New York Times article (1984)  
 New York Times article (1988)  
 New York Times article (1988) 
Mass Media reports 
 Favorable on rediscovering the D.R. 
 Favorable on D.R. being safe for travel 
 Favorable about D.R.’s tourism surge 
 Favorable on hotels being built in the D.R. Positive
1990-
1999 
Mass Media reports 
 The Independent -UK (1999)  
 Caribbean Living Magazine (1999) 
 Favorable on D.R.’s booming tourism sector 
 Favorable - D.R. is a best value destination Positive
2000-
2009 
Mass Media reports 
 US News & World Report (2000)  
 The Independent-UK (2009)  
 Favorable - D.R. ranked safe to travel alone 
 Favorable – review that D.R. is worth visiting Positive
2010-
2017 
Mass Media report 
 Daily Mail -UK (2016) 
Travel survey 
 Canadian Omni Survey (2012) 
Travel guide 
 Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean (2016) 
Travel reviews 
 TripAdvisor reviews 
Country Safety Rankings 
 SafeAround (2017) 
 UL Safety Index (2017)  
Mass Media report 
 Unfavorable— D.R. has high murder rate  
Travel survey 
 Favorable –Of 1,002, 7/10 view D.R. as safe 
Travel guide 
 Favorable—D.R. is ideal for travel 
Travel reviews 
 Favorable—most reviewers view D.R. as safe 
Country Safety Rankings 
 Unfavorable -D.R. is ranked 106/128 for safety 














                                                 
59 The country image perception references are listed in a separate page in the Works Cited section of this thesis 
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Appendix T - Tourism Arrivals and Receipts Graph (D.R.) 
Appendix T.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals and Receipts (D.R., 1930-1980): 
Pre & Early Tourism Period (1930-1980) 60 
 
Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1940-1980) 
 
Average rate of international arrivals Growth rate level 
0-6.99% Low average growth rate for international arrivals 
7-9.99% Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals 
10% - above High average growth rate for international arrivals 
 
Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 1940-1990) 
 
Average rate of International receipts  Growth rate level 
0-9.99% Low average growth rate of international receipts 
10-12.99% Moderate average growth rate of international receipts
13%- above High average growth rate of international receipts 
                                                 











1930 1971 1975 1979 1980
Total period growth rate for period = 16%
Dominican Republic Pre & Early Tourism Period (1930-1980)











Total period growth rate = 32%
Dominican Republic Early Tourism Period (1961-1980)
International tourism, receipts (current US$) Tourism Growth Rate
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Appendix T.2 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals (D.R., 1981-2000): 
Rising Tourism Period (1981-2000)61 
 
Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1980-1995) 
 
Average rate of international arrivals Growth level 
0-4.99% Low average growth rate for international arrivals 
5-7.99% Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals 
8% - above High average growth rate for international arrivals 
Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1995-2016) 
 
Average rate of international arrivals Growth level 
0-2.69% Low average growth rate for international arrivals 
2.7-4.99% Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals 
5% - above High average growth rate for arrivals 
 
  
                                                 
61 Two category scales cover this period due to the annual growth rate changes in the Caribbean region 










1985 1986 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total average growth per period = 10%
Dominican Republic Rising Tourism Period (1981-2000)
Number of international arrivals (per year) Tourism Growth Rate
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Appendix T.3 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Receipts (D.R., 1981-2000): 
Rising Tourism Period (1981-2000)62 
 
Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 1940-1990) 
 
Average rate of International receipts  Growth rate level 
0-9.99% Low average growth rate of international receipts 
10-12.99% Moderate average growth rate of international receipts 
13%- above High average growth rate of international receipts 
 
Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 1990-2000) 
 
Average rate of International receipts  Growth rate level 
0-12.99% Low average growth rate of international receipts 
13-17.99% Moderate average growth rate of international receipts 
18%- above High average growth rate of international receipts 
 
                                                 
62 Two category scales cover this period due to the annual growth rate changes in the Caribbean region 









1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1990 1991 1992 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total average growth for period = 15%
Dominican Republic Rising Period of Tourism (1981-2000)
International tourism, receipts (current US$) Tourism Growth Rate
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Appendix T.4 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Arrivals (D.R., 2001-2016): 
Golden Tourism Period (2001-2016)63 
 
Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (arrivals: 1995-2016) 
 
Average rate of international arrivals Growth level 
0-2.69% Low average growth rate for international arrivals 
2.7-4.99% Moderate average growth rate for international arrivals 
5% - above High average growth rate for international arrivals 
 
  
                                                 
63 The category scale in this period starts at 1995 due to the annual growth rate changes in the Caribbean region 
that started at that time.  But, this time period covers the tourism period in the Dominican Republic 
-0.03 -0.02










2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Average period growth rate = 5%
Dominican Republic Golden Tourism Period (2001-
2016)
Number of international arrivals (per year) Tourism Growth Rate
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Appendix T.5 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts/Receipts (D.R., 2001-2016): 
Golden Tourism Period (2001-2016)64 
 
Category Scale of Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (receipts: 2000-2016) 
 
Average rate of International receipts  Growth rate level 
0-3.89% Low average growth rate of international receipts 
3.9-5.99% Moderate average growth rate of international receipts 
6%- above High average growth rate of international receipts 
  
                                                 
64 The category scale in this period starts at 1995 due to the annual growth rate changes in the Caribbean region 
that started at that time.  But, this period covers the tourism period in the Dominican Republic 











2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Total average growth per period = 6%
Dominican Republic's Golden Period of Tourism (2001-2016)
International tourism, receipts (current US$) Tourism Growth Rate
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Appendix U – References for Country Image Perception (Haiti and D.R.) 
Data Sources 
Dominican Republic (1940-present) 
1) 1940s-1950s 
a. Missing data 
2) 1960s  
a. Travel guide information (negative review) 
i. Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean (1960) incl. 9 pgs. on D.R. (negative review on 
the Dominican Republic) 
3) 1970s 
a. Travel guide information 
i. Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean (1970)—information on Dominican Republic 
building its tourism sector (more positive than 1960 data) 
b. Mass media reports (positive) 
i. NYT article about D.R.’s tourism sector awaiting rediscovery (1971): 
https://www.nytimes.com/1971/01/17/archives/dominican-republic-awaits-
rediscovery-dominicans-await-rediscovery.html 
ii. NYT article about D.R. wooing tourists: 
https://www.nytimes.com/1977/02/07/archives/us-company-big-sugar-grower-
now-woos-tourists-in-caribbean.html 
iii. NYT article about DR: https://www.nytimes.com/1977/12/18/archives/whats-
doing-in-the-dominican-republic.html 
iv. NYT DR-Tourist’s gamble (1977): 
https://www.nytimes.com/1977/08/28/archives/a-capital-investment-
dominican-tourist-gamble-dominican-republic.html 
v. NYT article post-DR Best Kept Secret in Caribbean (1979): 
https://www.nytimes.com/1979/03/11/archives/the-dominican-republic-
dominican-republic-best-kept-secret-in-the.html 
vi. NYT article post-DR on list of countries with increased civil liberties and 
political rights (1979): https://www.nytimes.com/1979/01/08/archives/survey-
says-worlds-civil-liberties-have-increased-gain-in-dominican.html 






Country Image Perception Data Sources (Dominican Republic, 1940-present)  
1) 1980s  
a. Travel Guide information  
i. Fodor’s Guide to Caribbean (1980) 
b. Mass media reports 
i. NYT DR rediscovered: 
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/21/travel/rediscovering-the-dominican-
republic.html 
ii. NYT DR safe: https://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/08/nyregion/new-york-
day-by-day-a-tour-for-tourism.html 
iii. NYT article-DR tourism surges (1988): 
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/11/business/dominican-republic-
tourism-surges.html 
iv. NYT article: more hotel in DR being built (1988): 
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/07/business/caribbean-savors-a-tourism-
boom.html 
2) 1990s  
a. Mass media reports 
i. UK media report on DR-booming tourism: 
https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/the-secret-life-of-merengue-island-
1046049.html 
ii. Caribbean Living Magazine -DR is best value in the Caribbean: 
http://www.caribbeanliving.com/caribe/DominicanRepublic.htm 
3) 2000s 
a. Mass media reports 
i. US News & World report DR ranked 22 safe to travel alone and 46 in best 
countries for travel: https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/solo-
travel-full-list 





a. Mass media report 
i. Ministry of Tourism EcoTourism Dev. (2010)—incl. situation analysis of 
DR image - http://open_jicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/11999455_01.pdf 
b. Travel Survey 
i. Canadian Online Omni survey---D.R. is safe (2012) 
c. Travel Reviews 




d. Country Safety Rankings 





Country Image Perception Data Sources (Haiti, 1940-present)  
Haiti (1940- present) 
1) 1940s-1950s 
a. Missing data   
2) 1960s 
a. Travel Guide 
i. Fodor’s Travel Guide to Caribbean (1960) incl. 29 pgs. on Haiti (positive 
review) 
3) 1970s 
a. Mass Media Reports 
i. Sports Illustrated - incl. report of tourism surge in Haiti (1973) 
https://www.si.com/vault/1973/05/21/618336/to-hell-with-paradise 
ii. US/NY Times report incl. Haiti’s art (1974)-
https://www.nytimes.com/1974/09/08/archives/haitian-primitives-from-art-
form-to-souvenirs-art.html 
iii. US/NY Times report incl. safety (1976)- 
https://www.nytimes.com/1976/11/21/archives/whats-doing-in-haiti.html 
iv. People Magazine report on Papa Doc instability/tourism impact (1977)- 
http://people.com/archive/papa-doc-terrorized-and-pillaged-haiti-now-his-
son-aims-to-undo-the-damage-vol-8-no-20/ 
b. Travel Guide 
i. Fodor’s Travel Guide to Caribbean (1970) 
4) 1980s 
a. Mass Media Reports 
i. NY Times report on impact of AIDs rumor on Haiti’s tourism (1983)- 
https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/29/world/for-haiti-s-tourism-the-stigma-
of-aids-is-fatal.html 
ii. UK AIDs report on Haiti (attributed to tourist going to Haiti vs originating 
there—confirms it’s rumor vs real-2008 re 1982): 
http://www.progressio.org.uk/sites/default/files/HIV-AIDS-in-Haiti.pdf 




iv. US/NYT Haiti attractive for business (1984) 
https://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/17/business/haiti-s-allure-for-us-
business.html 
v. NYT (1986) FDI industry hopeful post-Duvalier 
https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/17/business/duvalier-flight-leaves-haiti-
industry-hopeful.html 
b. Travel Guide 
i. Fodor’s Travel Guide to Caribbean (1980)
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5) 1990s 
a. Mass Media Reports 
i. Baltimore Sun article on Club Med Haiti’s loss of tourists (1994) 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-10-09/news/1994282027_1_haiti-club-
med-luisetti  




a. Mass Media Reports 
i. 2001 country report on Haiti’s non-existent tourism sector since 1990: 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x9800e/x9800e10.htm 
7) 2010s 
b. Mass Media Reports 






ii. BBC article on Haiti’s safety for travel (2013):  
1. http://www.bbc.com/travel/story/20130110-is-haiti-safe-for-travellers 
iii. Haiti Hub website (2013) Is Haiti Safe?:  
1. https://haitihub.com/is-haiti-safe/ 




c. Country Rankings 
i. SafeAround website (country danger ranking-2017) 
1. https://safearound.com/americas/haiti/ 
ii. Social Progress Index (2017)-  
1. http://www.socialprogressindex.com/assets/downloads/scorecards/en/
HTI-Scorecard.pdf 
d. Travel Reviews 





e. Mass Media Reports 
i. USA Today (2018): http://traveltips.usatoday.com/dangers-travel-haiti-
102649.html 
ii. UK TraveSl Advice on Haiti (2018):  https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-
advice/haiti 
iii. New Zealand Safe Travel report (2018): https://www.safetravel.govt.nz/haiti
 
 
